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1 Introduction 
This thesis consists of three essays on the interconnectedness between banks and 
insurance firms. The aim is to answer two important research questions: First, what is 
the impact of shocks from the banking sector, and the financial crisis of 2008 in 
particular, on the stock prices of insurance firms and the competitive environment in the 
insurance sector? Second, do regulatory authorities have the means to mitigate such 
crises, that is, does the regulatory framework to predict and counteract financial distress 
in the insurance sector work adequately during a severe financial crisis? The first essay 
analyzes the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 on the competitive situation in 
the German insurance sector. In addition, it examines whether insurance groups’ 
strategic group affiliation can affect the performance of their subsidiaries. The second 
essay questions how reliably regulators can forecast the financial strength of insurance 
firms during the financial crisis of 2008. The third essay examines the impact of policy 
interventions during the crisis on the stock prices of U.S. insurance firms. In addition, it 
analyzes the stock market response of insurers towards various shocks from the banking 
sector.  
This section provides the motivation for the three essays and summarizes the 
main findings and contributions. 
Strategic Group Performance and Dynamics under Different Economic Conditions 
The first essay is entitled “Strategic Group Performance and Dynamics under 
Different Economic Conditions”. This essay is based on a joint work with Dr. 
Muhammed Altuntas and Prof. Dr. Sabine Wende, both from University of Cologne. A 
previous version of this essay has been presented at the annual meeting of the German 
Insurance Science Association (DVfVW) in March 2015 and at the annual meeting of the 
American Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA) in August 2014. The paper is 
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published in the April 2016 edition of The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance – 
Issues and Practice.  
A strategic group represents a set of companies within one industry that are 
similar with respect to key strategic dimensions (Hunt, 1972; Porter, 1979). In this 
essay, we analyse strategic groups in the German insurance market by first subdividing 
the insurance groups into strategic groups. Furthermore, we examine if strategic group 
affiliation affects the performance of the insurance groups’ subsidiaries in the German 
property-liability insurance sector. Finally, we examine the consequences of the 
financial crisis of 2008 on the strategic groups structure and examine whether changes 
in strategic group affiliation can be considered as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
For this analysis, company-level data of German insurance companies for the years 
2004-2012 is examined using cluster analyses and regression analyses. The dataset 
comprises 829 firm-year observations including 50 holding companies.  
Previous papers already tested if performance differences between firms can be 
explained by their strategic group affiliation. Our research contributes to the literature 
because these papers do not examine if these findings also hold for the subsidiaries of 
strategic group members. This provides valuable knowledge for performance analysis 
and benchmark purposes at the subsidiary level, because it extends available 
information on these firms given the potential influence of strategic group affiliation on 
its parent company and thus on its affiliate. In addition, we extend the literature on the 
impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on the insurance sector by analyzing the 
implications of the crisis for the business models of German insurance firms. 
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Solvency Prediction for Property-Liability Insurance Companies: Evidence from the 
Financial Crisis 
The second essay is entitled “Solvency Prediction for Property-Liability 
Insurance Companies: Evidence from the Financial Crisis”. This essay is based on a 
joint work with Prof. Dr. Sabine Wende from University of Cologne. A previous 
version of this essay has been presented at the Roundtable on Insurance Regulation and 
Governance at St. John’s University in October 2012, at the annual meeting of the 
Western Risk and Insurance Association (WRIA) in January 2013 and at the annual 
meeting of the German Insurance Science Association (DVfVW) in March 2013. For 
this paper, I received the Dorfman Doctoral Student Award 2013. The paper is 
published in the January 2015 edition of The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance – 
Issues and Practice.  
The solvency of insurance firms is tightly regulated in order to protect the 
policyholders by ensuring that the insurer will be able to meet its financial obligations 
in the future (Klein, 1995). To be able to intervene as early as possible and to minimize 
the potential costs associated with the financial distress of insurance firms, regulators 
aim to detect financially distressed companies at an early stage. Because 
macroeconomic factors can severely influence the solvency of insurance companies 
(Browne and Hoyt, 1995; Cheng and Weiss, 2012), it is of particular interest how 
reliably regulators can forecast their financial strength during the financial crisis. 
Against this background, we examine factors that predict the insurer’s regulatory 
solvency ratio using regression analyses and company-level data of German property-
liability insurers from 2004 through 2011. 
This research contributes to the literature by showing that the current degree of 
solvency is a reliable indicator for the insurers’ future financial strength even in times of 
financial crisis. This shows that a well calibrated prediction model allows German 
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regulators to detect companies in distress early enough even during a severe financial 
crisis. Because previous papers focus on the prediction of insurer’s financial strength in 
non-crisis times, our findings are highly relevant as we show that insurers in financial 
distress can be detected early enough to take appropriate action to protect policyholder’s 
interests. In addition, the analysis indicates a high degree of financial stability within the 
German insurance industry, showing that the sector was able to bear the consequences 
of the financial crisis.  
Policy Interventions and Banking Shocks: Evidence from the Insurance Sector 
The third essay is entitled “Policy Interventions and Banking Shocks: Evidence 
from the Insurance Sector”. This essay is based on a joint work with Prof. Dr. Martin F. 
Grace from Georgia State University and Prof. Dr. Sabine Wende from University of 
Cologne. A previous version of this essay has been presented at the annual meeting of 
the American Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA) in August 2013, at the annual 
meeting of the European Finance Association (EFA) in August 2013, at the annual 
meeting of the German Insurance Science Association (DVfVW) in March 2014, at the 
annual meeting of the European Financial Management Association (FMA) in June 
2014 and at the 13th Symposium on Finance, Banking, and Insurance in December 
2014.  
After analyzing the impact of the crisis on the competitive environment and the 
forecasting ability of regulators in the previous essays, this essay analyses the impact of 
policy interventions during the financial crisis on the stock prices of firms from the U.S. 
insurance sector which were designed to counteract the consequences of the crisis. 
Apart from “conventional” measures such as interest rate decreases, their interventions 
comprised a set of “non-conventional” measures such as monetary easing and liquidity 
provision. In addition, we examine the impact of banking-sector events (banking 
5 
 
bailouts and trading frauds) on insurance firms. Using a database of 89 policy 
announcements and 10 banking sector events, we use an event study methodology and 
regression analyses to examine how such events affected U.S. insurance firms using a 
sample of 375 firm year observations for property-casualty insurers and 217 firm year 
observations for life insurers. 
This research contributes to the literature by providing evidence for the 
effectiveness of policy measures regarding the stability of the insurance sector. Previous 
studies analyze the impact of policymakers’ interventions on banks (Ricci, 2015), 
interbank risk premia (Aït-Sahalia et al., 2012) and aggregate markets (Fiordelisi, 
Galloppo and Ricci, 2014), but exclude insurance firms from their analyses. Given that 
the insurance sector has been strongly affected by the financial crisis that originated in 
the banking sector (Cummins and Weiss, 2014; Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons, 2011), 
knowledge on measures that can restore the stability in the insurance sector is valuable 
for regulators, managers and policyholders of insurance firms. In addition, given that 
the financial crisis was largely caused by a shock from the banking sector, we contribute 
to the literature by providing evidence on the exposure of insurance firms from shocks 
arising from the banking sector. While previous papers on the interconnectedness 
between banks and insurers (e.g. Billio et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014) do not evaluate 
interconnectedness with respect to single, sector-specific events, we provide valuable 
knowledge for investors and regulators of insurance firms regarding the 
interconnectedness of the financial service sector.  
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2 Strategic Group Performance and Dynamics under Different 
Economic Conditions 
 
 
Abstract 
We analyse strategic groups in the German insurance market. We use cluster analysis to 
subdivide insurance groups into strategic groups. Furthermore, we analyse whether 
strategic group affiliation can affect the performance of the insurance groups’ property-
liability subsidiaries. In addition, we examine the consequences of the financial crisis of 
2008 on the competitive situation in the German insurance sector and examine whether 
changes in strategic group affiliation can be considered as a consequence of the 
financial crisis. Using a dataset of 829 firm year observations for the years 2004 to 
2012, our results indicate the existence of three strategic groups in the German 
insurance sector. In addition, we find that performance differences on subsidiary-level 
can be attributed to strategic group affiliation. Furthermore, we do not find evidence 
that the financial crisis induced changes in strategic group affiliation. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The strategic groups concept
1,2
 has been used in various research papers to 
analyse the different aspects of competitive strategy within an industry. A major 
purpose in examining this concept is to show that performance differences between 
firms
 
can be attributed to strategic group affiliation (e.g. Mehra, 1996). Moreover, 
several papers (Mascarenhas, 1989; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990) show that strategic 
group structures do not remain constant over time, but might change due to e.g. 
external, macroeconomic shifts such as financial crises. Knowledge of the competitive 
situation in the insurance industry with respect to the existence of strategic groups 
provides valuable knowledge for managers, shareholders and regulators of the 
respective industry, for example to evaluate the own company’s situation, to analyse the 
competitive environment and profit opportunities or to assess the potential success of 
new strategies and market entries (Fiegenbaum, Hart and Schendel, 1996). However, to 
our best knowledge, no research exists so far on the existence of strategic groups in the 
German insurance industry and their relation to performance and the financial crisis of 
2008.
3
 
In our research, we analyse strategic groups in the German insurance market. 
We first subdivide the insurance groups into strategic groups using cluster analysis. 
Given that the German insurance industry is a highly regulated industry with several 
                                                          
1
 A strategic group represents a set of companies within one industry that are similar with respect to key 
strategic dimensions (Hunt, 1972; Porter, 1979).  
2
 For the purpose of this paper, it is essential to distinguish between the term strategic group as defined 
above and the term insurance group that refers to a holding company consisting of several insurance 
firms. Thus, strategic group refers to ‘a group of firms pursuing similar strategies along strategic 
dimensions’, while insurance group refers to ‘a holding structure within the insurance sector’. Its 
subsidiaries are referred to as insurance companies or insurance subsidiaries. A strategic group member is 
an insurance group that is part of the respective strategic group. In some cases, a single insurance firm has 
no subsidiaries or a parent company. In these cases, we refer to these firms as insurance groups (holdings) 
as well. 
3
 The existing literature on strategic groups in the insurance sector mainly focuses on the U.S. insurance 
industry (e.g. Ferguson, Deephouse and Ferguson, 2000; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990, 1995). Berry-
Stölzle and Altuntas (2010) examine strategic groups in the German pension funds industry as a part of 
the German insurance system, but not the insurance industry itself. 
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important differences in comparison to the U.S. insurance industry,
4
 the results of 
previous studies might not be directly applicable in the German insurance sector.
5
 
Owing to the high degree of regulation, the firms should have comparable business 
models and firms from other sectors cannot directly compete in the German insurance 
market.
6
 Hence, the sector is protected from outside competition of non-insurers and 
thus highly eligible for an analysis of strategic groups. 
Additionally, we examine if strategic group affiliation affects the performance of 
the insurance groups’ subsidiaries in the German property-liability insurance sector. 
Previous literature (Mehra, 1996) already examined if performance differences between 
firms can be explained by their strategic group affiliation. However, these papers do not 
examine if these findings also hold for their subsidiaries. Recent literature shows that 
conglomeration can affect firms by e.g. internal capital markets and transfer of know-
how between holding members (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Hence, we know that 
holding structures can affect the subsidiaries’ characteristics and performance. Given 
that strategic group affiliation can affect the strategic group members’ performance and 
that holding affiliation can affect its subsidiaries’ performance, we analyse if there is 
also a link between an insurance groups’ strategic group affiliation and the performance 
of their subsidiaries. 
                                                          
4
 Given the harmonization of regulatory frameworks for insurance firms in the European Union in recent 
years, regulation in the German insurance industry follows standards comparable to other European 
countries.  
5
 The German insurance market is characterized by a large proportion of state-owned insurers, a low 
degree of capital market exposure and a very high level of stability and financial strength (Rauch and 
Wende, 2015) compared to the U.S. insurance sector. However, we are only aware of previous papers on 
strategic groups in the U.S. insurance industry. 
6
 For example, a legal entity can only write life, health or property–liability business (Berry-Stölzle and 
Born, 2012). Non-insurance firms cannot offer insurance policies. Moreover, the insurers’ investments 
are regulated by the Insurance Regulatory Law (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz) and the Solvency 
Ordinance (Kapitalausstattungsverordnung) regarding restrictions on investments in certain assets and 
diversification of assets. In addition, the regulatory authority can intervene in case of financial distress 
and demand changes in the insurer’s business operations to re-establish a sufficient degree of solvency 
(Rauch and Wende, 2015). However, this only occurs in rare cases, so regulators do in general not 
interfere with the insurers’ business strategies, thus allowing dynamics in the strategic groups structure. 
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Given that macroeconomic shifts like the financial crisis of 2008 were shown to 
affect an industry’s strategic group structure (Mascarenhas, 1989), we analyse if 
changes in strategic group affiliation can be considered as consequences of the crisis. 
Even though the insurance industry has not been affected by the financial crisis as much 
as the banking sector (Harrington, 2009; Rauch and Wende, 2015), the crisis affected 
the insurance industry to a certain extent.
7
 Even if the crisis might not have severely 
threatened the financial health of German insurance firms, it might have led to changes 
in the insurers’ business strategies and consequently changes in strategic group 
affiliation. For insurance groups that changed strategic group affiliation after the 
financial crisis, we look for factors that might have induced movements between 
strategic groups. For example, insurance groups with a high capital market exposure in 
their asset portfolio might rethink their business model after the crisis and thus change 
strategic group affiliation. 
For our analysis, we use company-level data of German insurance companies for 
the years 2004-2012. We employ a cluster analysis in order to subdivide insurance 
groups into strategic groups. We then use regression analyses to test if strategic group 
affiliation influences selected performance indicators of their subsidiaries from the 
property-liability sector. Our sample consists of 829 firm-year observations including 
50 holding companies.  
Our results indicate the existence of three strategic groups in the German 
insurance market. In addition, our analyses provide evidence that strategic group 
affiliation can affect the performance of the insurance groups’ subsidiaries. Regarding 
the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on strategic group dynamics, we find no 
evidence that factors related to the financial crisis affected changes in strategic group 
                                                          
7
 E.g. the crisis forced insurers to cut costs in order to maintain profitability; significant write-downs of 
financial assets; large losses in certain lines (e.g. credit insurance), thus evaluating strategic changes away 
to other, less risky business fields (Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons, 2011). 
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affiliation. This is consistent with previous literature and the general view that the crisis 
did not severely affect the German insurance industry.  
Our results are valuable for regulators by evaluating the impact of financial 
crises on the competitive situation in the German insurance market. By subdividing the 
insurance groups into strategic groups, we provide relevant information for insurance 
executives, given that managers use members of the same strategic groups as reference 
points when they evaluate their own company’s performance (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 
1995). Moreover, our analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on strategic group 
affiliation provides further insights on the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 
in the German insurance industry, given that we examine potential implications of the 
crisis for the insurers’ business models. Last, by analysing whether strategic group 
affiliation affects the performance of the insurance groups’ subsidiaries, we contribute 
to the literature on strategic groups as our research is, to our best knowledge, the first 
paper to analyse if strategic group affiliation not only affects the performance of 
strategic group members, but also their subsidiaries. We thereby provide important 
implications for performance analysis and benchmark purposes at the subsidiary level, 
as it extends available information on these firms given the potential influence of 
strategic group affiliation on its parent company and thus on its affiliate. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical 
background and provide the hypothesis development. In the third section, we describe 
our data and methodology. In the fourth section, we provide our empirical results. The 
final section concludes. 
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2.2 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
The strategic groups concept was developed to understand differences within 
given industries and can thus be used to analyse the competitive context within 
industries. It has mainly been developed by Hunt (1972) and Porter (1979, 1980). Porter 
(1980) defines a strategic group as ‘a group of firms pursuing similar strategies along 
strategic dimensions’. Prior to this, the companies within an industry were regarded as 
largely homogenous (Leask and Parker, 2007), except for differences in market share 
(Hall and Weiss, 1967; Marcus, 1969). 
However, the introduction of the strategic groups concept led to a different 
perspective on the competitive environment within industries. Instead of viewing the 
firms as homogeneous competitors, firms within an industry might choose different 
approaches to serve the same customers. Thus, strategic groups can be regarded as sets 
of firms that compete for the industry’s customers in different ways (Harrigan, 1985). 
The strategic groups concept provides valuable implications for the firms’ management, 
given that it shapes the managers’ understanding of the environment in which their firm 
operates (Reger and Palmer, 1996). 
The existence of strategic groups in the literature is mainly justified by the 
presence of mobility barriers. Mobility barriers can be understood as structural or 
strategic factors, which protect a strategic group from the entry of potential rivals within 
the industry (Caves and Porter, 1977). In contrast to “external barriers” discussed in 
traditional economic theory which prevent outside firms to enter an industry, these 
barriers delineate strategic groups from competing with each other within a given 
industry (Harrigan, 1985).
8
 Hence, firms are not able to move between strategic groups 
at will, given the presence of these barriers.  
                                                          
8
 In the context of the German insurance industry, “external barriers” refer to the regulatory framework 
that does not allow banks or other firms to directly write insurance policies in the German market, given 
12 
 
The strategic groups concept has mainly been used to explain performance 
differences within an industry in various studies. Given that most industries contain 
segments that are more profitable than others, a set of firms might persistently 
outperform its competitors (Porter 1979). For example, a firm that occupies a niche in a 
given industry might be prone to expand to other (more profitable) areas within the 
industry, but would be restricted to do so by the existence of mobility barriers. In 
addition, certain strategic groups might benefit from consumer preferences, e.g. due to 
group reputation, better promotion of products or other factors (Leask and Parker, 
2007). Thus, firms within strategic groups that are protected by high mobility barriers 
face less competition and could therefore enjoy superior performance.  
However, previous literature could not demonstrate an unambiguous relation 
between strategic group affiliation and performance differences within an industry. For 
example, Leask and Parker (2007) find performance differences between strategic 
groups in the U.K. pharmaceutical industry. In contrast, Cool and Schendel (1987) 
examine strategic groups in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, finding no performance 
differences in this sector.
9
  
These previous studies examine performance differences between holdings that 
built a strategic group, but not their subsidiaries. However, strategic group affiliation 
might not only affect the strategic group members on holding level (insurance groups, 
in our study), but also their subsidiaries because the subsidiaries usually follow a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
that a legal entity can only write life, health or property–liability business (Berry-Stölzle and Born, 2012). 
“Mobility barriers” in the insurance sector might arise due to building up a reputation in certain lines, 
which would protect these firms’ market shares from other insurance firms. If several firms are for 
example specialized in writing legal protection insurance, an insurer who enters this market segment 
might not easily gain market share given its lack of reputation, even though the regulatory environment 
allows entering this market. This might hamper movements from one strategic group to another.  
9
 Following related studies, we perform a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance to analyse if 
performance differences between strategic groups exist in our analysis. Following Leask and Parker 
(2007) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990), we test weather alternative measures of performance 
(profitability, risk, market share and efficiency) are significantly different between strategic groups in the 
German insurance market. Our results indicate significant performance differences regarding all 
performance indicators. The results are available upon request. 
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holding strategy and transfer their know-how within the holding. Therefore, we expect a 
close linkage between an insurance group (holding) and its subsidiary (Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001) due to the adoption of strategic group-specific characteristics.
10
 Hence, 
given the findings in previous studies, we know that holding (insurance group) 
structures can affect the subsidiaries’ performance. Furthermore, given that strategic 
group affiliation can affect the strategic group members’ performance and that holding 
affiliation can affect its subsidiaries’ performance, we analyse whether there is a link 
between strategic group affiliation and the performance of the subsidiaries of the 
strategic group holdings. Therefore, we extend the existing literature on strategic groups 
and state: 
H1: Performance differences between subsidiaries of members (insurance 
groups) of different strategic groups can be attributed to the parent 
companies’ strategic group affiliation. 
 
Another important aspect of strategic group literature approaches strategic group 
dynamics: The composition of strategic groups can vary over time, i.e. firms might 
leave one strategic group and join another one. Basically, moving at will between 
strategic groups can be difficult due to the existence of mobility barriers, as discussed 
above. Consistent with that, several research papers found a low level of inter-industry 
movements and thus a low degree of strategic group dynamics (Oster, 1982; 
Mascarenhas, 1989). This might stem from the fact that companies within a strategic 
group resemble each other regarding their skills, capabilities and assumptions about the 
                                                          
10
 Following Leff (1978), strategic group members are “linked by relations of interpersonal trust on the 
basis of a similar personal, ethnic or commercial background”. Moreover, capital transfers, the use of the 
parents companies’ brand name and reputation (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), and benefits from economies 
of scale and scope (Chang and Choi, 1988) can further enhance the link between a parent company and its 
subsidiary. 
14 
 
future. Hence, they should evolve similarly over time, given that they can anticipate 
each other’s reaction very precisely (Porter, 1979). 
However, depending on economic conditions, changes in business strategies 
might occur and thus may lead to changes in strategic group composition (Mascarenhas, 
1989). Given that firms are adaptable and try to adapt to environmental changes (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977), changes in economic conditions can lead to misalignments between 
a firm and its environment. Hence, the effectiveness of its current strategy can be 
reduced (Porter, 1980) and the firm might be prone to change its current strategy. This 
can lead to changes in strategic group affiliation. In particular, moving into a different 
strategic group can be facilitated in case of poor macroeconomic conditions (Hergert, 
1983).  
Mascarenhas (1989) examines strategic group dynamics over periods of 
economic stability, growth, and decline in international offshore oil-drilling. He finds a 
higher degree of strategic group dynamics in times of economic decline. Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas (1995) use strategic groups that act as reference points for others to explain 
strategic group dynamics in the U.S. insurance sector.
11
 However, we are not aware of 
any study that examines strategic group dynamics with respect to the financial crisis of 
2008 and its implication on strategic group affiliation. 
On the one hand, even though the insurance industry has not been affected by 
the financial crisis as strongly as the banking sector (Harrington, 2009; Rauch and 
Wende, 2015), the crisis affected the insurance industry to a certain extent, for example 
significant write-downs of financial assets and large losses in certain lines like credit 
insurance (Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons, 2011). Hence, insurers with a large capital 
market exposure (e.g. due to a large proportion of stocks in their investments) had an 
incentive to rethink their investment strategy and their corporate strategy. Similarly, 
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 See Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1995) for additional studies on the topic of strategic group dynamics. 
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companies that experienced earning shocks during the crisis might have shifted away 
from risky businesses and tried to change their business model. Hence, the crisis may 
lead to a change in strategic group affiliation. 
On the other hand, changes in strategic group affiliation might be completely 
unrelated to the financial crisis, given that these changes also occur under conditions of 
economic stability (Mascarenhas, 1989) and given the crisis’ low impact on the 
insurance industry. Hence, they might rather be the result of ordinary processes of 
restructuring and strategic changes, because of the appointment of a new CEO, as a 
consequence of continuous underperformances or a large natural catastrophe. 
Summarising, our second hypothesis states: 
H2: Strategic group dynamics in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 
can be attributed to factors that are related to the riskiness of the firm’s 
business strategy. 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
We use company (subsidiary)-level data from the annual reports of German 
insurance companies for the years 2004 to 2012. We drop insurer-year observations 
with negative or zero surplus, investments, and total assets (Liebenberg and Sommer, 
2008) and winsorize the data at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile.
12
 All variables are inflation-
adjusted using 2005 as base year. Our final sample consists of 829 firm-year 
observations from 2004 through 2012.  
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 Due to strong outliers, our measure of Return on equity, its standard deviation and Risk-adjusted return 
on equity are winsorized at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile, while all other variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 
and 99
th
 percentile. However, our results are consistent if they are also winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentile. 
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For our analysis, we form our strategic groups on holding (insurance group)-
level, as strategic decision making rather takes place at the top of the holding structure 
than on subsidiary-level. Thus, following for example Leask and Parker (2007), we use 
holding-level data in a first step and cluster our insurance groups into strategic groups.
13
 
In a second step, we use company-level data to examine if strategic group affiliation 
affects the performance of the insurance groups’ subsidiaries in the German insurance 
sector.
14
 Given the strongly different business models, we do not include life or health 
insurance companies in this part of our analysis. Thus, for the analysis on subsidiary-
level, we focus on the property-liability insurance subsidiaries of the insurance groups 
only, while the analyses on insurance group-level also include information on the 
insurance groups’ activities in life and health business.15 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Given that our database does not include holding-level data, we aggregate affiliated insurers, 
controlling for potential double counting of intra-group shareholding (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008; 
Altuntas and Gößmann, 2015). For unaffiliated insurance companies, each single company was accounted 
as its own pseudo group. Our database accounts for more than 90% of the overall premium volume of the 
German property-liability insurance industry. 
14
 Forming strategic groups on holding (insurance group)-level ignores that strategies might be set by the 
parent but can still vary across subsidiaries, as some of them might follow different business models than 
other subsidiaries because they serve different market segments. However, most related papers cluster 
strategic groups on holding-level for the above mentioned reasons (e.g. Leask and Parker 2007; Mehra 
1996). For the purpose of our study, forming strategic groups on holding (insurance group)-level is 
required for several reasons. First, our research question particularly aims to analyse the relation between 
strategic group affiliation on holding level and performance on the subsidiary-level. While in certain 
cases clustering on subsidiary-level can be more appropriate, our research approach requires grouping on 
holding-level as this relationship could not be examined if grouping was done on subsidiary-level. 
Grouping on subsidiary-level and comparing performance differences between these strategic groups 
would just repeat the research in previous papers. Moreover, using only subsidiary information for the 
clustering would neglect important information: Even though subsidiaries might follow different 
strategies than set by their parents, there might still be a strong impact of the parent on each subsidiary 
(Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). In addition, even though their strategies differ, they are still affected from 
being members of the group, e.g. due to the parent’s reputation and capital transfer, internal transfer of 
knowledge and managers, company-specific guidelines and capital transfers. Hence, clustering on 
subsidiary-level would ignore these effects.  
15
 Including life and health business related information while forming strategic groups is necessary given 
that while single firms are restricted to write either life, health or property-liability business, holding 
companies consist of separate legal entities that write different types of business. In our dataset, a few 
holdings purely write property-liability business, while no holding in the sample is focused on life/health 
insurance business only. Also, the firms’ degree of diversification regarding life/health and property-
liability business is considered as a major strategic factor for clustering strategic groups (Johnson, 
Ranigan and Weisbart, 1981).  
17 
 
2.3.2 Methodology 
2.3.2.1 Strategic Groups in the German Insurance Sector 
Following related studies, we employ cluster analysis to identify strategic groups 
at the insurance group-level.
16
 Following these studies, we cluster firms into strategic 
groups based on two sets of factors that are thought to be associated with the acquisition 
of competitive advantage: (1) factors that capture the scope commitment of the firms’ 
operation and (2) factors that deal with the firm’s resource commitment. The scope 
commitment factors include e.g. variables related to the firm’s product diversity, market 
segments targeted and the firm’s size. The resource commitment factors include 
information on the firm’s resource deployment, e.g. distribution methods and 
investment or financing strategies. We follow Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990, 1995) 
and Ferguson, Deephouse and Ferguson (2000) and use the following set of insurance 
business-specific variables for our cluster analysis. 
 
Scope commitment variables 
We use the insurance group's property-liability business market share in the 
German insurance market to measure its positioning in the German insurance sector 
(Group PC%), given that the share of property-liability business can significantly affect 
the firm’s return on scale (Johnson, Ranigan and Weisbart, 1981) and thus the firm’s 
performance.  
A high degree of diversification might reduce the insurer’s risk, but also its 
performance (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008). We use a Herfindahl index based on 
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 See Harrigan (1985) for details on cluster analyses. 
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gross premiums earned in the respective line of business to capture the business 
segments covered by the insurer (Herfindahl).
17
 
Larger firms might enjoy economies of scale and thus better performance 
(Scherer, 1980). Moreover, size can affect the firm’s market power, flexibility and 
strategic response to environmental challenges. We include an indicator of insurer size, 
measured by the natural logarithm of its total assets (Ln(total assets)).  
Furthermore, we include the insurer’s age in years (Age).18 Given that insurance 
business requires a high degree of trust, reputation is an important asset for the insurer’s 
strategy and its success. The insurer’s age is highly correlated with its reputation to 
provide reliable coverage and its survival probability (Anderson and Formisano, 1988).  
The firm’s ownership form can strongly affect its strategy, given that it provides 
different incentives for the firm’s managers. For example, stock firms might be more 
profit-oriented (Mayers and Smith, 1981) and thus show a better performance. We 
include a dummy variable that equals one if the insurer is a mutual insurer (Mutual).
19
 
 
Resource commitment variables 
Following Ferguson, Deephouse and Ferguson (2000) we include a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm mainly writes policies using a single distribution 
channel (Distribution channel).
20
 There are various benefits which can result from the 
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 The lines-of-business are: personal accident, personal liability, total auto, legal expenses, fire, 
homeowners’ personal property, residential and commercial building damage, transportation, credit 
insurance and other miscellaneous business. 
18
 Ferguson, Deephouse and Ferguson (2000) measure age as the year of their analysis (1996) minus the 
insurer’s year of incorporation, which leads to a constant measure of age over the observation period. For 
robustness, we perform another cluster analysis using their definition of age but receive identical results. 
19
 Another ownership form in the German insurance sector are public insurers. These are founded as non-
profit, state-owned organizations with the purpose to serve a certain region or administrative district (For 
further information, see Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro, 2010). However, given their different 
regulation and ownership structures, we exclude them from our analysis. 
20
 To measure the firms’ strategic scope regarding its customers, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) include 
a measure of the firms’ premiums written in commercial lines vs. the premiums written in personal lines. 
19 
 
use of multiple channels: First, insurance firms can reach an extended coverage of the 
market by employing various distribution channels (Coelho and Easingwood, 2004). 
Further, knowledge and information about customers can be shared by different 
channels (Easingwood and Coelho, 2003). An insurer which uses different channels is 
also able to target different customer segments or to reach new customer segments by 
this way. Moreover, the use of multi-channel distribution may be suitable to meet the 
needs of existing customers in a better way (Tsay and Agrawal, 2004). Hence, the 
choice of whether to use single or multi-channel distribution has significant strategic 
implications regarding relative managerial control over product marketing and degree of 
potential market penetration, as well as overall cost effectiveness, among other 
competitive factors (Barrese and Nelson, 1992).  
Reinsurance can affect the firm’s strategy and performance in several ways, for 
example the reduction of the insurer’s risk and the stabilization of its profits (Ferguson, 
Deephouse and Ferguson, 2000). Furthermore, the reinsurer pays the “reinsurance 
commission” to the primary insurer as a mutually agreed price as a compensation for the 
administrative expenses incurred by the insurer in generating the business and settling 
loss claims (Meier and Outreville, 2006). Since the use of more reinsurance increases an 
insurer’s underwriting capacity and generates reinsurance commissions as income, we 
argue that reinsurance can accelerate new competitive opportunities (Mayers and Smith, 
1990). Thus, we use the ratio of GPW (gross premiums written) minus direct GPW to 
direct GPW to measure the firm’s degree of reinsurance (Reinsurance).  
The firm’s operational leverage affects its performance ratios and the insurer’s 
risk (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990). To measure the insurer’s financing strategy, we 
                                                                                                                                                                          
This data is not available in our dataset, because German accounting standards do not require that 
insurance companies make this distinction. 
20 
 
use the insurer’s operational leverage (Op. leverage), measured as the ratio of NPW (net 
written premiums) to the firm's book equity.
21
  
Finally, we include the ratio of stocks and real estate to total investments to 
measure the firm’s investment strategy (Asset risk). A high proportion of stocks and real 
estate should increase the firm’s profitability, but also its risk (Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 1990). 
Given that cluster analysis groups the firms into clusters regarding their degree 
of similarity using a set of factors, the results might be skewed by the relative scale of 
the factors used as cluster variables (Leask and Parker, 2007). Thus, the clustering 
results can be affected by the scale and unit of measurement of variables (Kim and Mc 
Intosh, 1999). Hence, we use z-scores to transform all variables to a common scale prior 
to our cluster analysis. 
We employ two cluster analyses in order to examine whether strategic group 
affiliation changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. First, we cluster the 
firms for the years 2004-2008 (pre-crisis period). Second, we employ an additional 
cluster analysis using the years 2009-2012 (post-crisis period). This approach follows 
related papers that analyse the effects of events that lead to environmental changes on 
firm strategy, thereby dividing the observation period into two sub-periods that include 
all years of the analysis (Kim and McIntosh, 1999; Cho and Hambrick, 2006).
22
 We use 
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 A more precise measure of equity would include full risk capital that includes other forms of capital to 
back losses than just book equity. However, such data is not available at the insurance group-level.  
22
 We classify the year 2009 as post-crisis year because previous research indicates that the crisis affected 
the German insurance sector only weakly, and the effects are mostly limited to the year 2008 while the 
industry has already strongly recovered in 2009 (Rauch and Wende, 2015), given that performance 
indicators and solvency capital of German insurance firms almost returned to pre-crisis levels already in 
2009. For robustness, we did several cluster analyses to validate our clustering results. First, we exclude 
the years 2008 and 2009 from our clustering procedure, as the restructuring process could take place in 
these years. In another cluster analysis, we use the years 2004 till 2006 as our pre-crisis period and the 
years 2010 till 2012 as post-crisis period, hence excluding the years 2007-2009. Our results are almost 
unaffected by these approaches and can be requested upon demand. However, these clusterings are 
associated with a large loss of data and hence valuable information is lost. Therefore, we follow Kim and 
McIntosh (1999) and Cho and Hambrick (2006) and include all years in our analysis without excluding 
any year that captures an environmental change. 
21 
 
the years 2009 to 2012 giving the firms time to adapt their strategies to the new market 
environment after the crisis, as strategic changes might take years to unfold (Kim and 
Mc Intosh, 1999). To be able to examine strategic group dynamics, i.e. movements 
between strategic groups between these periods, we only include insurance groups that 
are contained in our dataset during the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period, i.e. 
they must have at least one observation during 2004-2008 and at least one observation 
during 2009-2012. 
 
2.3.2.2 The Effect of Strategic Group Affiliation on the Insurance 
Groups’ Subsidiaries 
To examine the effect of strategic group affiliation on the insurance groups’ 
subsidiaries’ performance, we estimate the following regression model on company-
level for the years 2004-2012:
23
 
Performancei,t = f(Strategic group affiliationi,t, Firm-specific factorsi,t) (1) 
 
We use different measures of performance for our analysis to validate our 
findings. First, we use Return on assets and Return on equity as dependent variables 
(Performancei,t) in our regressions. Given that higher returns might just be a 
consequence of higher risk taking, we use Risk-adjusted return on assets and Risk-
adjusted return on equity as dependent variables in our regressions as alternative 
measures of performance. Risk-adjusted return on assets (equity) is the firm’s Return on 
assets (equity) divided by its standard deviation of the previous 5 years.
24
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 Given that our dataset indicates a panel structure, standard errors are clustered on firm-level and 
include year-fixed effects. We use clustered standard errors because Petersen (2009) writes that “Cluster 
standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity” (p. 438) and standard errors clustered by firm “are robust 
to any form of within-cluster correlation” (p.459). We do not include firm-fixed effects due to the binary 
and time-invariant nature of our main variables of interest (Dummy strategic group 1-3), Subsidiary and 
Mutual.  
24
 In addition, to control for risk-taking in our regressions using non-adjusted performance measures 
(ROA and ROE), we include the performance measure’s standard deviation of the previous 5 years as a 
22 
 
To measure the subsidiaries strategic group affiliation, we include a dummy 
variable (Dummy strategic group 1-3) for each strategic group equal to one if the 
subsidiaries’ parent company is part of the respective strategic group. Hence, we include 
two dummy variables for the three strategic groups in our regression (the third dummy 
is omitted). Firm-specific factors denote a vector of control variables associated with 
insurer performance in previous research. We include Size, measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Given that, all else equal, larger insurers have a lower risk of 
insolvency, they can charge higher prices and thus show a higher performance 
(Sommer, 1996). In addition, larger firms might have market power and thus a higher 
degree of performance (Cummins and Nini, 2002). We control for the firm’s operational 
leverage by including Op. leverage, the ratio of NPW to the firm's regulatory equity 
capital.
25
 Because safer insurers might charge higher prices, a high degree of leverage 
might indicate a low degree of safety and thus lower performance (Sommer, 1996). 
Moreover, we control for insurers’ business mix by adding a Herfindhal index based on 
gross premiums earned in the respective line of business, as diversification might affect 
performance positively by scope economies, larger internal capital markets, and risk 
reduction (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008).
26
 In addition, we control for the insurer’s 
ownership form by including a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a mutual 
insurer (Mutual). Owner–policyholder conflicts are less relevant for mutual insurers, but 
stock insurers might benefit from better corporate control mechanisms (Liebenberg and 
Sommer, 2008). Finally, we include Subsidiary, a dummy variable equal to one if the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
control variable for risk-taking in our model (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008). Alternative approaches to 
capture firm risk are market-based indicators of risk. However, these measures are not available in our 
dataset. Our regressions include further measures of risk (asset risk and operational leverage) that capture 
additional aspects of the firm’s risk. By including these measures, we capture most factors relevant to the 
firms’ risk. 
25
 This measure of capital includes e.g. paid-in capital stock and parts of the firms’ subordinate debt. See 
Rauch and Wende (2015) for additional details. 
26
 For robustness, we include the percentages of premiums written in each line of business to measure 
diversification. The main results remain unaffected. The regression outputs are available upon request. 
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subsidiary is part of a holding (insurance group) structure. A subsidiary might receive 
benefits (capital transfer and know-how) from its holding company, hence showing a 
higher level of performance. The parent company might withdraw funds from its 
subsidiary, hence negatively affecting its performance. In addition, we include the 
amount of subsidiaries in the group to control for the size of the insurance group 
(Number of subsidiaries).
27
  
 
2.3.2.3 The Consequences of the Financial Crisis for Strategic Group 
Affiliation 
To examine the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 regarding strategic 
group dynamics, we examine changes between pre-crisis period strategic groups 
affiliation and post-crisis period strategic groups affiliation. Hence, we estimate the 
following logit-Model: 
ΔSG affiliationi,post-crisis= α + β1 ROAi,2008 + β2 ROA shocki,2008 + β3 Herfindahli,2008 
+ β4 Sizei,2008 + β5 Number of subsidiariesi,2008 + β6 Op. leveragei,2008  
+ β7 Asset riski,2008+ β8 Premium growthi,2008 
(2) 
 
ΔSG affiliationi,post-crisis is a dummy variable equal to one if an insurance group - 
has moved from one strategic group to another one within the post-crisis period and 
zero if it remains in the same strategic group as during the pre-crisis period.
28
 
For this part of the analysis, we examine the transition from the pre-crisis period 
to the post-crisis period.
29
 We analyse if changes between strategic groups that occur 
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 We use variance inflation factors (VIFs) to test for multicollinearity among the independent variables in 
our analysis. The mean VIF is well below the benchmark level of 10. This indicates that multicollinearity 
between our explanatory variables does not appear to be a concern (Belsley et al., 2005; Chatterjee and 
Hadi, 2013).  
28
 This analysis is conducted on insurance group-level only, given that we formed strategic groups on 
insurance group-level, even though the crisis might have also induced changes in business strategy on 
subsidiary-level. However, following our definition of insurance groups, it also contains single insurance 
firms that have no subsidiaries or a parent company. 
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between these periods (i.e. if an insurance group changes strategic group affiliation and 
becomes member of another strategic group) can be explained by firm-specific factors 
in the year 2008.
30
 This would indicate that insurers react to the crisis regarding their 
risk exposure and potentially change their business strategy. Furthermore, including the 
years 2009-2012 as post-crisis period allows us to analyse strategic changes that might 
occur over a longer time horizon, as such changes might take place directly after the 
crisis in the year 2009 or in later years. We include factors that mostly represent the 
riskiness of the insurers’ business strategy. Given that the crisis might induce insurers to 
rethink their business models, these factors might be associated with changes in 
strategic group affiliation as a consequence of the crisis.  
We include the firm’s return on assets (ROA) of the year 2008, because a large 
loss in the year of the crisis (2008) might indicate weaknesses of the insurer’s current 
strategy. Moreover, we analyse if the firm experienced a shock to earnings (ROA 
shock), measured by the percentage change of its ROA between the years 2007 and 
2008, as a major, relative loss in the crisis year might induce managers to change the 
strategy towards a safer strategy in order to prevent financial problems in future turmoil. 
Given that previous literature showed that focused insurers outperform 
diversified insurers (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008), diversified insurers have an 
incentive to change towards a rather focused strategy. Herfindahl indicates a Herfindahl 
index based on gross premiums earned in the respective line of business.  
All else equal, larger insurers have a lower risk of insolvency (Sommer, 1996). 
Hence, we include Size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. In addition, 
we include a measure of the total number of subsidiaries in the insurance group 
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 The post-crisis period lasts from 2009 to 2012, hence changes in strategy might happen in one of these 
years or even happen as a slow process over several years in this period. 
30
 For robustness, we repeat the regression analysis using independent variables from 2007. The results 
remain consistent. 
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(Number of subsidiaries), as its ability to change strategic group affiliation might be 
restricted by the size and complexity of the insurance group. 
Firms with a higher degree of riskiness might rather be induced to change their 
strategic group affiliation in the aftermath of the crisis. Op. leverage and Asset risk refer 
to operational leverage (ratio of NPW to the firm's equity) and asset risk (ratio of stocks 
and real estate to total investments),
31
 indicating the riskiness of its financing and 
investment strategy.  
Finally, we include the recent growth rate (Premium growth) of NPW (from 
2007 to 2008), as premium growth is associated with an increase in the company’s risk, 
in particular in times of economic downturn (Chen and Wong 2004).
 32
 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1-3 show descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analysis. The 
number of observations and the mean for variables on subsidiary-level (Table 1) and 
insurance group-level (Table 2 and Table 3) are presented.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the company (subsidiary)-level variables 
used in our regression analysis (Hypothesis 1). The results show a relatively high 
amount of risky assets (22.82%), which appears relatively high for a sector that is 
known for a high degree of solvency and the absence of insurer failures (Rauch and 
Wende, 2015). Moreover, the table shows that the majority of firms are affiliated in a 
holding structure: 93% of the firms in our sample are subsidiaries of an insurance 
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 For robustness, we analyze if measures of asset risk relative to the insurers’ liabilities change the 
results, given that the level of risk is relative to the underlying liabilities and hence potentially different 
for insurers with large shares of life insurance activities. Our results remain unaffected when using these 
measures. 
32
 We also compare the insurers’ premiums written in each line of business and its asset composition 
before and after the crisis. The unreported results do not indicate significant changes in the firms’ 
business composition. 
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group.
33
 In addition, the table indicates that about 52% of the single companies belong 
to Strategic group 3, which is the largest strategic group in our sample. Consistent with 
previous findings for the insurance sector during the financial crisis, the results show 
that the German property-liability insurance industry has been relatively profitable on 
average during the observation period, indicated by all performance measures. 
Table 1 Summary Statistics at Subsidiary-Level 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA (%) 829 4.13 4.58 -12.56 17.93 
ROE (%) 829 22.06 20.40 -16.25 63.39 
RAROA 829 2.74 3.02 -2.73 15.68 
RAROE 829 2.66 2.60 -1.03 8.96 
Size 829 5.93 1.40 3.33 9.03 
Op. leverage 829 2.88 1.63 0.20 19.17 
Asset risk (%) 829 22.82 16.11 0.00 73.94 
Herfindahl (%) 829 54.68 30.94 15.94 100.00 
Mutual (%) 829 50.06 50.03 0.00 100.00 
Subsidiary (%) 829 93.12 25.32 0.00 100.00 
Number of subsidiaries 829 7.15 4.63 1.00 24.00 
Standard deviation ROA (%) 829 2.53 2.11 0.16 11.18 
Standard deviation ROE (%) 829 13.23 10.50 2.15 40.33 
Dummy strategic group 1 (%) 829 25.33 43.52 0.00 100.00 
Dummy strategic group 2 (%) 829 22.32 41.66 0.00 100.00 
Dummy strategic group 3 (%) 829 52.35 49.97 0.00 100.00 
Note: This table shows the summary statistics for insurers at subsidiary-level for the years 2004-2012. 
ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. ROE is the ratio of net income to total equity. RAROA is the 
ratio of ROA to the standard deviation of its ROA of the last five years. RAROE is the ratio of ROE to the 
standard deviation of its ROE of the last five years. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets 
in million €. Op. leverage is the ratio of NPW to equity. Asset risk is the amount of stocks and real estate 
divided by total investments. Herfindahl denotes a Herfindahl index based on gross premiums earned in 
different lines of the firm’s property-liability business. Mutual is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm is a mutual insurer. Subsidiary is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is member of an 
insurance group. Number of subsidiaries denotes total number of subsidiaries in the insurance group. 
Standard deviation ROA is the standard deviation of its ROA of the last five years. Standard deviation 
ROE is the standard deviation of its ROE of the last five years. Dummy strategic group 1-3 denote 
dummy variables equal to one if the firm’s parent company is part of the respective strategic group based 
on our cluster analysis. 
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 Among the 50 insurance groups in our sample, 7 are single unaffiliated firms while 43 are holding 
companies that consist of more than one insurance firm. 
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Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the holding (insurance group)-level 
cluster variables that we use to identify strategic groups. It can be seen that 54.40% of 
our insurance groups are classified as Mutual insurance groups. Comparable to the 
findings on subsidiary-level, the table indicates a relatively high proportion of risky 
assets (26.14%). In addition, it can be seen that property-liability business accounts for 
the largest share of revenue of German insurance groups (55.11%).  
Table 2 Summary Statistics Strategic Clustering Variables (Insurance Group-
Level) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Scope commitment variables 
    Group PC% (%) 443 55.11 33.98 5.09 100.00 
Herfindahl (%) 443 43.57 26.88 15.18 100.00 
Ln(total assets) 443 6.36 1.64 3.49 10.43 
Total assets 443 2,127.43 4,341.35 32.69 33,911.80 
Mutual (%) 443 54.40 49.86 0.00 100.00 
Age 443 114.84 46.96 18.00 215.00 
Resource commitment variables 
   Distribution channel (%) 443 51.92 50.02 0.00 100.00 
Reinsurance (%) 443 5.12 9.75 0.00 74.85 
Op. leverage  443 2.37 1.10 0.45 7.49 
Asset risk (%) 443 26.14 15.84 0.00 81.50 
Note: This table shows the summary statistics for cluster variables to form strategic groups for the years 
2004-2012. Group PC% denotes the proportion of gross premiums earned in property-liability business 
by the group’s overall gross premiums earned. Herfindahl denotes a Herfindahl index based on gross 
premiums earned in different lines of the group’s property-liability business. Ln(total assets) is the natural 
logarithm of the group’s total assets in million €. Total assets is the group’s total assets. Mutual is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the group’s legal form is a mutual insurer. Age denotes the age of the 
group. Distribution channel is a dummy variable equal to one if the group’s distribution system is 
concentrated on one channel. Reinsurance denotes the proportion of reinsurance ceded to a reinsurer. Op. 
leverage is net written premiums divided by the firm’s equity. Asset risk is the amount of stocks and real 
estate divided by total investments. 
Moreover, Table 3 shows the summary statistics of a set of variables that proxy 
for the firms’ risk on holding (insurance group)-level to examine the consequences of 
the financial crisis of 2008 on strategic group affiliation (Hypothesis 2). It can be seen 
that 22% of the firms changed strategic group affiliation in the aftermath of the crisis 
(ΔSG affiliation). Hence, 11 insurance groups changed their affiliation. Moreover, as 
indicated by a positive ROA, it can be seen that the average insurance group was 
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profitable even during the peak of the financial crisis. However, as indicated by ROA 
Shock, the table indicates that average profitability strongly decreased during the year 
2008, on average by 24.32%. Moreover, the industry was still able to increase its 
premium revenue by 1.4% on average during the economic downturn in 2008, 
indicating that the financial crisis did not lead to strong decreases in insurance demand. 
Table 3 Crisis Impact Summary Statistics (Insurance Group-Level) 
Variable Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
ΔSG affiliation (%) 50 22 41.85 0.00 100.00 
ROA2008 (%) 50 4.24 4.26 -7.96 15.40 
ROA shock2008 (%) 50 -24.32 123.50 -660.05 386.46 
Herfindahl2008 (%) 50 43.13 27.20 15.23 100.00 
Size2008 50 6.35 1.68 3.74 10.25 
Number of subsidiaries2008 50 4.66 3.69 1.00 17.00 
Op. leverage2008 50 2.35 1.05 0.61 5.62 
Asset risk2008 (%) 50 25.43 15.37 0.00 73.07 
Premium growth2008 (%) 50 1.40 6.66 -24.97 23.49 
Note: This table shows the summary statistics for each insurer at holding-level. ΔSG affiliation is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the insurer changes from one strategic group to another one after the crisis 
and zero if it remains in the same strategic group. ROA is the firm’s lagged return on assets. ROA shock is 
the percentage change of its ROA. Herfindahl indicates a Herfindahl index based on gross premiums 
earned in the respective line of business. Size is the natural logarithm of the Insurance Group’s total 
assets in million €. Op. leverage is the ratio of NPW to the firm's equity. Asset risk is the ratio of stocks 
and real estate by total investments. Premium growth is the growth rate of NPW. All independent 
variables are from the year 2008. Number of subsidiaries denotes total number of subsidiaries in the 
insurance group. 
 
2.4.2 Strategic Group Classification Results 
Our cluster analysis identifies three strategic groups in the German insurance 
market.
34
 The finding is similar to Ferguson, Deephouse and Ferguson (2000) and 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) who identify, depending on the period, around three 
main strategic groups in the U.S. insurance industry. To validate the classification 
results of our cluster analysis, we use several confirmatory techniques. This is an 
                                                          
34
 An earlier version of our analysis included public insurers in the clustering process. Not surprisingly, 
these firms have been assigned to their own, fourth, group. However, as discussed earlier, we decided to 
exclude these firms from our analysis given their different business models. The results of this clustering 
process are available upon request. 
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important step in determining strategic groups for empirical analyses, as groupings 
might otherwise rather be statistical artifacts than meaningful classifications of the 
industry’s firms (Leask and Parker, 2007). First, we validate our findings visually by 
using dendograms.
35
 Second, we compare our results to another classification using a k-
means algorithm to subdivide the firms into strategic groups (Dess and Davis, 1984)
36
 
Our classification results are robust against both confirmatory techniques, hence 
providing further evidence on the existence of three strategic groups in the German 
insurance market.
37
  
Our analysis yields the following strategic groups:
38
 Table 4 shows that group 1 
(“Small, specialized insurers”) contains relatively small insurers that focus on one or 
only a few lines of business (e.g. credit insurers or legal expense insurers like Coface 
Kredit or Roland). This is indicated by a Herfindahl of 63.86% in pre-crisis times and 
69.25% in post-crisis times. Mainly, they are involved in property-liability business, 
indicated by a share of 85.98% of gross premiums earned in property-liability business 
by the group’s overall gross premiums earned in pre-crisis times (86.32% in post-crisis 
times). This group mostly contains relatively small insurers, in particular in the post-
crisis period (indicated by €327.28 million of Total assets). Given that most of these 
firms are focused in certain lines of business that suffered from severe losses during the 
financial crisis (e.g. credit insurance), it is not surprising to see that the number of firms 
in this strategic group severely decreased after the crisis.  
                                                          
35
 Dendograms “are visual depictions of the sequence of convergence among clusters as the level of 
similarity within clusters decreases” (Ketchen, Thomas and Snow, 1993). See Aldenderfer and Blashfield 
(1984) for further information.  
36
 The k-means algorithm “assigns the cluster membership of each observation to the cluster with the 
nearest centroid” (Ketchen, Thomas and Snow, 1993). See Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) for further 
information. 
37
 Results are available upon request. 
38
 A list of insurance groups included in each strategic group is available upon request.  
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Group 2 (“Focus on life/health business”) consists of insurers that are mainly 
focused on life/health insurance business like Barmenia or Debeka. They are relatively 
risk averse regarding their low level of Asset risk (15.65% and 24.35%, respectively) 
and hence require much lower levels of reinsurance than firms in other strategic groups 
(1.31% and 1.05%). This strategic group contains only mutual insurers. Compared to 
the first group, this group is characterized by a relatively high degree of diversification 
(represented by a Herfindahl of 28.87% and 35.80%). 
Group 3 (“Big, diversified insurers”) consists of major companies like Allianz or 
HUK Coburg, i.e. large firms with a long tradition in the German insurance market. 
Also, major foreign players with substantial business in the German insurance industry 
are members of this strategic group, like AXA, Zurich or Generali. Given their size 
(indicated by €5,224.24 and €5,918.25 million of Total assets, respectively), it is not 
surprising that these firms are also strongly diversified and active in many different 
lines of insurance business (Herfindahl of 26.72% and 28.18%, respectively). Their 
investment strategy is based on a relatively high degree of risky assets (indicated by 
Asset risk of 27.09% and 28.63%). Moreover, the Group mostly consists of large, 
international insurers that can be considered as financial conglomerates, given their 
larger shares of financial activities and bancassurance. Thus, analyzing this strategic 
group can provide valuable insights given that the financial crisis may affect those 
financial conglomerates stronger than pure insurance companies. 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics Strategic Groups (Insurance Group-Level) 
SG 1: Small, specialised insurers 
  Panel A: Pre-crisis (2004-2008)   Panel B: Post-crisis (2009-2012) 
Variable Obs Mean   Obs Mean 
Group PC% (%) 103 85.98 
 
61 86.31 
Herfindahl (%) 103 63.86 
 
61 69.26 
Ln(total assets) 103 5.60 
 
61 5.27 
Total assets 103 549.41 
 
61 327.28 
Mutual (%) 103 46.60 
 
61 19.67 
Age 103 81.45 
 
61 77.08 
Distribution channel (%) 103 71.84 
 
61 54.10 
Reinsurance (%) 103 4.21 
 
61 10.05 
Op. leverage 103 2.28 
 
61 1.98 
Asset risk (%) 103 32.02  61 24.56 
      SG 2: Focus on life/health business 
  Panel A: Pre-crisis (2004-2008)   Panel B: Post-crisis (2009-2012) 
Variable Obs Mean   Obs Mean 
Group PC% (%) 53 12.56 
 
80 36.58 
Herfindahl (%) 53 28.87 
 
80 35.80 
Ln(total Aassets) 53 5.47 
 
80 5.79 
Total assets 53 454.59 
 
80 676.73 
Mutual (%) 53 100.00 
 
80 100.00 
Age 53 121.26 
 
80 125.50 
Distribution channel (%) 53 90.57 
 
80 90.00 
Reinsurance (%) 53 1.31 
 
80 1.04 
Op. leverage 53 2.24 
 
80 2.01 
Asset risk (%) 53 15.64  80 24.35 
      SG 3: Big, diversified insurers 
  Panel A: Pre-crisis (2004-2008)   Panel B: Post-crisis (2009-2012) 
Variable Obs Mean   Obs Mean 
Group PC% (%) 85 47.49 
 
58 45.08 
Herfindahl (%) 85 26.72 
 
58 28.18 
Ln(total assets) 85 7.96 
 
58 8.16 
Total assets 85 5,224.24 
 
58 5,918.25 
Mutual (%) 85 29.41 
 
58 34.48 
Age 85 143.18 
 
58 150.85 
Distribution channel (%) 85 0.00 
 
58 0.00 
Reinsurance (%) 85 8.57 
 
58 4.91 
Op. leverage 85 2.72 
 
58 2.99 
Asset risk (%) 85 27.09  58 28.63 
Note: Panel A shows the summary statistics for each strategic group for the years 2004-2008. Panel B 
shows the summary statistics for each strategic group for the years 2009-2012. SG 1-3 denotes the 
respective strategic groups for this period. See Table 2 for variable description. 
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2.4.3 The Effect of Strategic Group Affiliation on the Insurance Groups’ 
Subsidiaries’ Performance 
Hypothesis 1 states that performance differences between subsidiaries of 
members of strategic groups can be attributed to the parent company’s strategic group 
affiliation. Table 5 shows the regression results analyzing the relation between 
performance and the parent companies’ strategic group affiliation. The results provide 
evidence for Hypothesis 1. We find significant relationships between performance and 
the parent companies’ strategic group affiliation for subsidiaries of Strategic group 2 
and mostly for Strategic group 3, irrespective of the performance measure. Consistent 
with the literature, our results suggest that in general the parent companies’ strategic 
group affiliation can affect the subsidiaries’ performance. This finding might indicate 
that the subsidiaries of an insurance group are affected by the holdings’ know-how (e.g. 
are more efficient due to transfers of knowledge from its holding) or benefit from its 
parent company’s reputation and thus sell more insurance policies because the 
subsidiary appears to be more reliable to consumers. In addition, it supports the finding 
of prior papers (e.g. Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008) who find that focused insurers 
outperform diversified insurers: Both Strategic groups 2 and 3 perform poorly relatively 
to Strategic group 1, which follows a focus strategy (as indicated by a Herfindahl of 
63.86% in pre-crisis times and 69.25% in post-crisis times). 
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Table 5 Regression Results at Subsidiary-Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 (ROA) (ROE) (RAROA) (RAROE) 
Size -0.004 0.009 0.096 0.098 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.183) (0.162) 
Op. leverage -0.005
***
 0.006 -0.215
*
 -0.132 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.111) (0.103) 
Asset risk -0.010 0.016 1.714 1.188 
 (0.031) (0.119) (1.615) (1.485) 
Herfindahl -0.010 -0.037 0.275 0.493 
 (0.012) (0.060) (0.667) (0.637) 
Mutual -0.000 0.004 0.323 0.133 
 (0.008) (0.040) (0.575) (0.477) 
Subsidiary 0.028 0.091 1.792 1.913
*
 
 (0.020) (0.083) (1.207) (1.072) 
Number of subsidiaries 0.002
**
 0.011
***
 0.000 0.015 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.048) (0.042) 
Dummy strategic group 2 -0.019
*
 -0.081
*
 -1.333
**
 -1.150
**
 
 (0.011) (0.046) (0.628) (0.547) 
Dummy strategic group 3 -0.025
**
 -0.095
*
 -0.980 -1.149
*
 
 (0.011) (0.050) (0.662) (0.616) 
Standard deviation ROA -0.295    
 (0.227)    
Standard deviation ROE  0.177   
  (0.159)   
Constant 0.067
**
 0.023 1.286 0.715 
 (0.030) (0.133) (1.576) (1.511) 
R2 0.103 0.113 0.087 0.076 
Adj. R2 0.083 0.093 0.068 0.056 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 829 829 829 829 
Note: This table shows the results of pooled OLS regressions using clustered standard errors at firm-level 
for the years 2004-2012 at subsidiary-level. Columns (1)-(4) denote the results of different regression 
analyses, using ROA, ROE, RAROA and RAROE, as dependant variables as denoted in the second line, 
respectively. ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. See Table 1 for variable 
description. 
 
2.4.4 The Consequences of the Financial Crisis for Strategic Group 
Affiliation 
Hypothesis 2 states that strategic group dynamics in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of 2008 can be attributed to factors that are related to the riskiness of the 
firm’s business strategy. Table 6 presents the results of a logit regression examining 
whether changes in strategic group affiliation can be attributed to factors related to the 
firms’ risk and thus endanger the firm in times of crisis, providing evidence to rethink 
their business strategy.  
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Table 6 Regression Results at Insurance Group-Level 
 (Logit) 
ROA2008 -1.896 
 (10.596) 
ROA Shock2008 0.154 
 (0.379) 
Herfindahl2008 -1.329 
 (1.838) 
Size2008 -0.316 
 (0.403) 
Number of Subsidiaries2008 -0.017 
 (0.184) 
Op. Leverage2008 -0.541 
 (0.437) 
Asset Risk2008 4.542
*
 
 (2.599) 
Premium Growth2008 -2.729 
 (6.255) 
Constant 1.479 
  (2.714) 
Number of Observations 50 
Note: This table shows the results of a logistic regression for changes in strategic group affiliation 
between the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period, using firm-specific variables from the crisis year 
2008 as independent variables. The table shows the regression results at holding-level. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. See Table 3 for variable description. 
We find very limited evidence for Hypothesis 2, as only Asset risk is significant 
at the 10% level in our analysis, indicating that insurance groups with a riskier asset 
portfolio were more likely to change strategic group affiliation in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. However, consistent with previous literature (Harrington, 2009; Rauch 
and Wende, 2015) we conclude that the impact of the financial crisis on the German 
insurance sector was low. Instead, changes in strategic group affiliation might rather be 
the result of ordinary processes of restructuring and strategic changes, e.g. due to the 
appointment of a new CEO or sector-specific events like natural catastrophes.
39
 
Moreover, our results indicate a relatively high degree of strategic group dynamics in 
the German insurance market: We find that 11 of the 50 insurance groups (22%) change 
their affiliation during the financial crisis. Even though these changes may not be 
attributed to the consequences of the financial crisis, this indicates relatively low 
                                                          
39
 For robustness, we compare the clustering variables of insurance groups that changed strategic group 
affiliation and those who remained in the same strategic group using t-tests. In addition, we compare the 
clustering variables of insurance groups that changed strategic group affiliation between the pre-crisis 
period and post-crisis period. For both analyses, we find almost no significant differences, providing 
further evidence for the low impact of the crisis on the German insurance sector. The results are available 
upon request. 
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mobility barriers in the German insurance market, given that insurance groups change 
their strategic group affiliation relatively frequently.
40
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This study aims to examine strategic groups in the German insurance sector. We 
cluster insurance groups into strategic groups and examine whether performance 
differences can be attributed to strategic group affiliation on subsidiary-level. 
Furthermore, we analyse whether changes in strategic group affiliation in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis of 2008 can be considered as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
Our results indicate that performance differences between subsidiaries of insurance 
groups can be attributed to the strategic group affiliation of their parent companies. 
Consistent with previous research, we find that the impact of the financial crisis on the 
German insurance sector was negligible and strategic group changes appear to be 
unrelated to the financial crisis of 2008. 
Our research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our study is, to 
our best knowledge, the first study that examines strategic groups in the German 
insurance sector. Second, we extend the existing literature on strategic groups by 
providing evidence that performance differences between firms’ strategic group 
members’ subsidiaries can also be attributed to strategic group affiliation. Third, we add 
to the literature the impact of the financial crisis on the insurance industry by showing 
that the insurers’ business models appear to be mostly unaffected by the consequences 
of the crisis. 
The results have valuable implications for insurance executives, shareholders 
and regulators. For managers, our analyses provide valuable knowledge on the 
                                                          
40
 As an example, Mascarenhas (1989) shows that only up to 10% of the firms in the offshore oil-drilling 
industry change their strategic group affiliation during crisis-times. 
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competitive situation in the German insurance market that can be used to analyse the 
firms’ competitors. For shareholders, our analyses show profitable strategic groups and 
insurance groups in the insurance sector that might outperform their competitors in the 
long run and thus provide superior investment opportunities. Insurance regulators can 
use the findings to gain further knowledge on the impact of the financial crisis on the 
German insurance sector.  
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3 Solvency Prediction for Property-Liability Insurance Companies: 
Evidence from the Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The financial crisis of 2008 generated sizeable losses in the financial sector around the 
world. Because regulators are used to predict insurers’ financial strength to detect 
financial distressed firms as early as possible, we question how reliably regulators can 
forecast the financial strength, especially during a financial crisis. We use company-
level data of German property-liability insurers from 2004 through 2011 to examine 
factors that affect the insurer’s regulatory solvency ratio. Furthermore, we develop a 
prediction model to classify the insurers regarding their financial strength. We show that 
in particular the lagged solvency ratio can be used to predict the future regulatory 
solvency ratio irrespective of the economic conditions. Thus, our results imply that 
German regulators are able to detect insurers in financial distress early enough to take 
appropriate actions to protect the policyholders’ interests. Our results do not support the 
adoption of tighter regulations or higher capital requirements. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 generated sizeable operating losses in the financial 
sector around the world. In the banking industry, the turmoil in the financial markets led 
to an erosion of the bank’s equity and thus a substantial amount of failures within the 
sector (Acharya et al., 2011). Despite these failures, the insurance industry was not 
affected as strongly as other industries in the financial sector (Harrington 2009), due to 
their proper financial strength and conservative business models among others. 
However, we question how reliably insurance regulators can assess and predict the 
financial strength of insurers to detect distressed firms as early as possible, especially in 
times of economic downturns.  
In this research, we examine the effect of the most recent financial crisis on the 
prediction quality of German property-liability insurers’ financial strength from the 
regulator’s perspective. We use publicly available accounting data to examine factors 
that affect insurers’ regulatory solvency ratio. Additionally, following the common 
German regulatory practice we develop a prediction model to classify insurers regarding 
their financial strength two years in advance. This model allows us to investigate the 
prediction quality of financially distressed firms during financial crises. 
The need for reliable solvency prediction models for insurance companies arises 
from asymmetric information problems in insurance markets. Due to costly information 
and agency problems (Munch and Smallwood, 1982), consumers are not able to 
properly assess the insurers’ financial strength before purchasing insurance coverage. 
Thus, failures in the insurance industry can have severe consequences. In order to 
overcome the asymmetric information problem, insurance companies around the world 
are subject to particularly strong supervision and regulation. An important subcategory 
of insurance regulation is solvency regulation. The aim of solvency regulation is to 
protect the policyholders by ensuring that the insurer will be able to meet its financial 
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obligations in the future (Klein, 1995). To be able to intervene as early as possible and 
to minimize the potential costs associated with insurer financial distress, regulators use 
early warning systems to detect financially distressed companies. 
Our research builds on a large amount of prior studies that have been devoted to 
the prediction of the insurers’ (in-)solvency.41 However, to protect policyholders it is 
important to examine how reliable these predictions are in times of economic downturn. 
As macroeconomic factors can severely influence the solvency of insurance companies 
(Browne and Hoyt, 1995; Cheng and Weiss, 2012), it is of particular interest how the 
recent financial crisis affected the credibility of solvency prediction for insurance 
companies. The deterioration of the overall economic situation can lead to severe losses 
in the insurance sector and thus erode the company’s equity base. Solvency prediction 
has to remain consistent even in times of crisis and prediction models have to provide 
reliable estimates of the insurers’ future financial situation.  
We use company-level data of German property-liability insurers from 2004 
through 2011 to examine factors that predict insurers’ regulatory solvency two years in 
advance, in particular focusing on the financial crisis and the subsequent recession in 
2008 and 2009. We use the solvency ratio as defined by German regulatory law as an 
indicator for the insurers’ future financial strength. Using OLS regressions for each year 
separately, we find that today’s solvency ratio is a reliable indicator for the insurers’ 
future solvency ratio even in times of financial crisis, while a prediction model that 
excludes today’s solvency ratio has much lower explanatory power. Hence, we show 
that a two-year ahead prediction model allows German regulators to detect companies in 
distress early enough even in times of economic downturns. Moreover, we show that 
aggressively increasing premiums to raise market share can lead to a deterioration of the 
                                                          
41
 See for example Grace, Harrington and Klein (1998); Cummins, Grace and Phillips (1999); Carson and 
Hoyt, (1995); Browne and Hoyt (1995); Cheng and Weiss (2012); Chen and Wong (2004); Sharpe and 
Stadnik (2007); Kleffner and Lee (2009); Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro (2010). 
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insurers’ solvency ratio in an economic downturn, but also in the years surrounding the 
crisis. In addition, we examine the impact of investment risk on German insurers’ 
solvency ratio. Given the turmoil in the financial markets during the financial crisis, 
insurers with risky assets might have suffered more from the downturn and thus their 
solvency ratio might have been negatively affected. However, our empirical results 
indicate that investment risk is not a good predictor of insurance companies’ solvency. 
Our results contribute to the literature on solvency prediction in several ways. 
First, we provide evidence that the solvency ratio of German property-liability insurers 
can be assessed with a high degree of accuracy even in times of financial crisis. Second, 
we show that in particular today’s solvency ratio can be used to predict the future 
solvency ratio regardless of the economic conditions. Thus, our results imply that 
German regulators are able to detect insurers in financial distress early enough to take 
appropriate action to protect policyholder’s interests. Third, we contribute to the 
literature on insurance regulation, as the analysis shows a high level of stability within 
the German insurance industry, indicating the industry was able to bear the 
consequences of the financial crisis.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a summary of trends in 
solvency ratios and profitability for the German property-liability insurance industry as 
a whole. The following section provides a conceptual background and some regulatory 
details on solvency regulation in Germany. The subsequent section describes our data 
and methodology, and the ensuing section presents our results. The final section 
concludes. 
 
3.2 Time Trends in the German Property-Liability Insurance Industry  
We begin by illustrating the impact of the financial crisis and subsequent 
recession on the income and capital positions of German property-liability insurers. 
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Figure 1 shows the impact of the financial crisis on two macroeconomic indicators, the 
growth of the German Gross Domestic Product and the development of the German 
Stock Index (DAX). Both lines show that Germany was substantially affected by the 
financial crisis, as is shown in the substantial drop of the indicators in 2008 and 2009. 
This raises the question of how the financial crises affected the German property-
liability insurers and their financial strength in particular. 
Figure 1 German Macroeconomic Indicators: 2004-2011 
 
Note: This figure plots the growth of the German gross domestic product (GDP) and the DAX (German 
stock exchange index) for the years 2004 – 2011. The solid line presents the DAX Growth; and the 
dashed line shows GDP Growth. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the German property-liability insurers’ average 
return on equity (ROE) and return on investment (ROI), measured by the realized 
investment return for the year. Both lines show that the German property-liability 
insurers were substantially affected by the financial crisis. Property-liability insurers 
experienced a dramatic drop in ROE during 2008 while ROI fell slightly. 
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Figure 2 German Property-Liability Insurers’ ROE and ROI: 2004-2011 
 
Note: This figure plots the return on equity (ROE) and the return on investment (ROI) for the sample of 
property-liability insurers described in the text. The solid line presents the ROI; and the dashed line shows 
the ROE. 
Figure 3 plots the average regulatory solvency ratio for German property-
liability insurers from 2004-2011. On average, the insurers’ regulatory solvency ratio 
over the whole time period seems not to be strongly negatively affected by the crisis. In 
fact, the average solvency ratio remains at a relatively constant level of about 400%, 
showing that the average insurer is far from financial distress. However, there is an 
observable drop in 2008 indicating that the reliable prediction of the single insurers’ 
regulatory solvency remains an important question even in times of economic 
downturns. Given that the failure of one or more large insurers can have severe 
consequences for the economy and the insurance sector, regulators are concerned about 
individual insurers’ solvency in addition to the industry’s average situation.  
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Figure 3 German Property-Liability Insurers’ Solvency Ratio: 2004-2011 
 
Note: This figure plots the solvency ratio for the sample of property-liability insurers. We measure the 
solvency ratio using the specific level of equity as a function of underwriting risk of an insurance 
company required by the German law. 
 
3.3 Solvency Prediction and Solvency Regulation in Germany 
3.3.1 Solvency Prediction Literature 
Solvency prediction models that help regulators, investors and other 
stakeholders to determine the kind of information that is useful for predicting financial 
distress or insolvency as early as possible have been discussed in the literature 
extensively. Since Altman (1968) introduced business failure models, similar 
approaches have been developed for industrial companies and banks, as well as for 
insurance companies. Failure prediction models for insurance companies were first 
developed by Trieschmann and Pinches (1973) and were primarily used to predict 
failures in the U.S.-insurance industry (see for example Grace, Harrington and Klein 
(1993, 1998); Cummins, Grace and Phillips (1999) Browne and Hoyt (1995); Cheng 
and Weiss (2012)). 
In the absence of insurer insolvencies in Germany during recent decades, these 
models are not appropriate for our analysis. Therefore, we refer to the literature on 
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solvency prediction (the prediction of insurers’ regulatory solvency ratios instead of 
insurer failures) as follows. To our knowledge, only a few studies have been published 
using data from outside the U.S. Kramer (1996) assesses the financial strength of 
property-liability insurers in the Netherlands. For the reason that bankruptcies are rare, 
the dependant variable is a ternary variable, subdividing the firms in financially strong, 
moderate and weak companies. Chen and Wong (2004) examine the financial health of 
property-liability and life insurers from Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan. The 
insurers’ solvency is used as dependant variable because no insurer failures occurred in 
these countries, with the exception of Japan. Sharpe and Stadnik (2007) predict 
financial distress among Australian general insurers. Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro 
(2010) develop a prediction model for German insurers using the two year lagged 
solvency ratio to predict insurers’ future regulatory solvency. The focus of the study is 
to develop a test that detects fuzzy regression coefficients. The model that is used to 
predict the solvency of German insurers thereby serves as a test to detect those 
regressors. Because their prediction model is developed for the year 2004 only, it has 
not been tested in times of economic downturn. Furthermore, it does not test its ability 
to correctly classify insurers regarding their financial strength.  
Given the fact that wrong classifications, for example assuming a distressed 
insurance company to be financially healthy, can be associated with substantial costs 
and unfavorable consequences, regulators need prediction models that have a 
sufficiently high predictive power in order to fulfill their regulatory function to protect 
policyholders. However, the prediction models constructed in previous studies can 
classify insurers regarding their financial strength with a relatively high degree of 
accuracy. But so far, no research has been devoted to the question how precisely the 
solvency prediction of German property-liability insurance companies can be assessed 
especially during a financial crisis. 
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3.3.2 Solvency Regulation in Germany 
The rationale for solvency regulation stems from inefficiencies in insurance 
markets due to costly information and agency costs (Munch and Smallwood, 1982). In 
the absence of solvency regulation, the lack of consumer information and the existence 
of agency costs could promote insurer insolvencies. Hence, solvency regulation aims to 
decrease insurers’ insolvency risks in dependence of the society’s preference for safety 
(Klein, 1995). 
Germany has a long history of supervision and regulation in the financial sector. 
Since 1901 German insurance companies have been broadly and tightly supervised and 
regulated.
42
 Due to close supervision and large capital holdings there have been no 
relevant failures since the Second World War. Solvency regulation is an important part 
of the German insurance supervision. Its main purpose is to protect the policyholders. It 
aims to guarantee an adequate level of capitalization for each insurance company in 
order to absorb potential losses and maintain the ability to settle its claims. The 
regulations described below are based on European-wide standards (Solvency I) in the 
German insurance regulatory system. Because Solvency II has not been fully 
implemented within the European insurance sector, yet, the analysis in this paper is 
based on the current Solvency I accounting standards. 
The current solvency regulation is mainly covered in the insurance regulatory 
law (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz) and the Solvency Ordinance 
(Kapitalausstattungsverordnung).
43
 The regulation is undertaken by the German Federal 
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 The insurance supervision is mainly codified in the Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz and the Gesetz über 
die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. See Berry-Stölzle and Born (2012) for a more 
detailed discussion of the German insurance market and its regulatory environment. 
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 See Directive 2002/13/EC of the European Parliament and the council Directive 73/239/EEC. 
According to German law insurers’ equity contains the sum of paid-in capital stock, additional paid-in 
capital, retained earnings, profit-sharing rights outstanding and subordinate debt minus expenditure for 
the start-up or the expansion of business operation, goodwill of the company, and deferred taxes, and 
minus the net loss for the year if applicable.  
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Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, 
BaFin). Each individual insurance company is subject to regulation at the company-
level. The regulation distinguishes between life insurers, health insurers and property-
liability insurers. Given the fact that the analysis in this study is restricted to property-
liability insurers, regulation regarding life and health insurance companies will not be 
examined in more detail. 
Because individual German insurers are not traded no market data exist.
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Therefore, regulators use the insurers’ regulatory solvency ratio to measure and to 
monitor insurers’ financial strength. The calculation of the solvency ratio according to 
German solvency regulation is undertaken in two steps. First, the required solvency is 
derived as the amount of capital the insurer has to hold in dependence of the amount of 
its underwriting risk. Second, this value is compared to the company’s current solvency, 
the assets that can be used to back its obligations. The ratio of the insurers required 
solvency and its current solvency has to be equal or greater than one. If this ratio falls 
below one, insurance regulatory law provides several actions the regulatory authority 
can undertake to re-establish a sufficient degree of solvency.
45
 In general, German 
property-liability insurers hold much more capital than required by this law. In 2011, 
the current solvency for all property-liability insurers amounted to 314% on average of 
the required solvency (BaFin: Annual Report 2011). Regulatory supervision is mainly 
based on observing the development of the regulatory solvency ratio.
46
  
As Table 7 indicates, the solvency ratio is subject to some fluctuation, as single 
insurers’ solvency ratios might increase or decrease much stronger than their mean, 
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 Only large holding companies like Allianz Group are traded, but not the single affiliates. 
45
 See para. 81b section 1 VAG (insurance regulatory law). For example, the BaFin can require a 
solvency plan that includes measures to either increase the current solvency (e.g. by increasing the 
company’s equity) or to decrease the required solvency (e.g. by increasing reinsurance).  
46 
However, the BaFin possesses internal information in addition to the solvency ratio in order to assess 
the insurers’ financial condition.  
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justifying the monitoring of individual companies in order to prevent unexpected 
decreases in the solvency ratio. Panel A shows the mean change, the standard deviation 
and the number of observations of the solvency ratio in our observation period, showing 
some degree of fluctuation in the ratio. Panel B confirms this finding. For each year, we 
subdivide the insurers into quantiles, depending on their solvency ratio. Panel B shows 
the number of companies that moved between these quantiles from year t to t+1. It can 
also be seen that in each year about 17%-23% change their quantile, indicating a certain 
degree of fluctuation. In addition, we examine the shift of regulatory solvency ratio in 
each year, since large, unexpected changes in the ratio might severely endanger the 
firms. Panel C shows the number of insurers whose solvency ratio changed by at least 
5%, 10% and 20%, respectively, compared to the preceding year. We find evidence for 
a certain degree of fluctuation of the solvency ratio at the company-level.
47
 
 
3.4 Data and Methodology  
3.4.1 Sample Selection 
We use company-level data from the annual reports of German property-liability 
insurance companies for the years 2004 to 2011. We include all property-liability 
insurance companies with premiums greater than 50 million Euros, covering about 96% 
of the premiums written. We drop insurer-year observations with negative or zero 
surplus, total assets, and net premiums written. Since we use two-year lagged variables, 
we exclude firm-year observations for which two-year lagged variables are not 
available. Our final sample consists of 863 observations from 2004 through 2011. 
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 We analyzed companies whose solvency ratios fell below 100% in a given year individually. The 
unreported results show that in all cases except one, the solvency ratio exceeded 100% in the following 
year again and did not fall below 100% again during our examination period, providing evidence for the 
effectiveness of the German approach to capital requirements in initiating regulatory action before 
insurers become insolvent. In one case (Mondial Assistance), the ratio kept fluctuating for several years. 
However, the company was part of the Allianz group and is still in business. 
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Table 7 Changes in Solvency Ratio 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
 
Panel A: Percentage of Change in Regulatory Solvency Ratio 
Mean Change 6.11% 0.72% -0.64% 12.26% 0.11% -2.96% 2.73% 
Std. Dev. 27.10% 18.26% 18.04% 17.81% 14.47% 15.53% 19.65% 
Obs. 105 107 106 107 102 94 621 
Panel B: Number of Changes between 25%- Quantiles 
Changed 25%-Quantile 22 18 19 25 20 16 120 
% Change 20.95% 16.82% 17.92% 23.36% 19.61% 17.02% 19.32% 
Remained in same 25%-Quantile 83 89 87 82 82 78 501 
 
Panel C: Number of Significant Changes in Regulatory Solvency Ratio 
Change >5% 77 79 80 89 61 64 450 
% of all 73.33% 73.83% 75.47% 83.18% 59.80% 68.09% 72.46% 
Change >10% 42 53 57 61 33 37 283 
% of all 40.00% 49.53% 53.77% 57.01% 32.35% 39.36% 45.57% 
Change >20% 10 17 27 31 8 10 103 
% of all 9.52% 15.89% 25.47% 28.97% 7.84% 10.64% 16.59% 
Note: Panel A shows the mean change, the standard deviation and the number of observations of the 
solvency ratio in our observation period. In Panel B, we subdivide the insurers into quantiles, depending 
on their solvency ratio. The first quantile consists of 25% of the insurers with the lowest solvency ratio; 
the fourth quantile consists of 25% of the insurers with the highest solvency ratios. The second and third 
quantile consists of insurers whose solvency ratios are among 25%-50% and 50%-75%. The columns 
indicate the number (percentage) of companies that changed their quantile from year t to t+1 or remained 
in their quantile from year t to t+1, respectively. Panel C shows the number (percentage) of insurers 
whose solvency ratio changed by at least 5%, 10% and 20%, respectively, compared to the preceding 
year.  
 
3.4.2 Summary Statistic 
Table 8 shows summary statistics for the variables used in our regression 
analysis. All monetary values are inflation adjusted and converted to 2011 Euros. The 
average solvency ratio for all insurers in our sample is 418%.
48
 Furthermore, the 
average return on assets is 3.1%. The average combined ratio is 95.34% indicating that 
the average insurer in our sample makes underwriting profit. The average premium 
growth amounts to 2.4% per year. Our sample consists of 10% mutual insurers and 8% 
public insurers. The remaining insurers are stock companies. 
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 With respect to multicollinearity of the variables used in our analysis, the unreported results indicate 
low variance inflation factors (1.8 on average), with a maximum of 3.25 between two variables in the 
year 2011. Hence, we assume that multicollinearity aspects can be ignored in our analysis. 
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Table 8 Summary Statistics from 2004-2011 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Solvency Ratio (%) 863 418.11% 491.94% 69.49% 4025.25% 
Ln (solvency ratio) 863 5.74 0.67 4.24 8.30 
Investment Risk 863 0.26 0.17 0.00 0.81 
Premium Growth (%) 863 2.41% 13.89% -110.47% 143.72% 
Ln (Assets) 863 6.17 1.32 3.46 10.33 
Operational Leverage 863 2.78 8.99 -0.54 261.13 
ROA (%) 863 3.07% 3.99% -18.20% 19.13% 
Combined Ratio 863 95.34 10.64 40.80 145.29 
Herfindahl Index 863 0.50 0.31 0.13 1 
Indicator: Mutual 863 0.10 0.30 
  Indicator: Public 863 0.08 0.27   
Note: This table reports summary statistics for variables used in the subsequent analysis. All monetary 
values are inflation adjusted and converted to constant 2011 Euros and are reported in million Euros. 
Solvency Ratio is the solvency ratio as defined by the German regulatory law: The equity capital held by 
an insurance company divided by the amount of equity capital required for the company. Ln(solvency 
ratio) is the natural logarithm of solvency ratio. Investment Risk is the percentage of stocks and real estate 
in the investment portfolio. Premium Growth is the year-on-year percentage change in net written 
premiums. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total general account assets. Operational Leverage is the 
ratio of net premiums written and equity capital. ROA is the return on assets measured as the ratio of net 
income and total assets. Combined Ratio is the ratio of the sum of losses and expenses and earned 
premium. Herfindahl Index is Σai
2/( Σai)
2
, where ai represents the gross premiums earned in business line 
i. Indicator: Mutual is a dummy variable indicating for whether the insurer is organized as a mutual 
insurer and Indicator: Public is a dummy variable indicating for whether the insurer is organized as a 
public insurer.  
 
3.4.3 Solvency Prediction Model 
We perform an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard 
errors to examine the factors affecting the solvency ratio.
49
 We run separate analyses for 
each year to test whether there are differences in the relationship between the solvency 
ratio and the other factors in times of crises and in times of non-crisis. In the absence of 
failures in the German insurance market, we follow the German regulator’s perspective 
and predict the insurers’ regulatory solvency ratio as defined by the BaFin. The BaFin 
uses a two-year forward-looking prediction model to decide whether insurance 
companies are in financial distress and have to be inspected or need to develop a 
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 Following Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro (2010), we suspect the standard errors to be 
heteroskedastic. The results of a Breusch-Pagan-Test indicate a substantial amount of heteroscedasticity 
in our model. Therefore, we use robust standard errors for our estimation. 
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business plan to restore its solvency to the appropriate level. Therefore, we use a 
prediction model of insurers’ solvency ratio as defined in the regulatory law and we 
include all independent variables in the model with a two-year lag. This approach is 
similar to Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro (2010), Chen and Wong (2004) and Kramer 
(1996) who predict the solvency ratio instead of the insurers’ insolvency. 
We use standardized coefficients in order to compare the magnitude of the 
effects of the indicators on the insurers’ solvency ratio. The specification of the model is 
as follows:       
Ln(solvency ratio)i,t = β1 Ln(solvency ratio)i,t-2 + β2 Investment Riski,t-2  
+ β3 Premium Growthi,t -2 + γ’Xi,t-2 + εi,t-2 
(3) 
 
where the dependent variable is ln(solvency ratio) measured as the natural logarithm of 
insurer i's solvency ratio in year t. We use the natural logarithm of the solvency ratio 
and not the solvency ratio itself because the solvency ratio is skewed to the right (Hair 
et al., 2006, Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro, 2010). All independent variables are 
lagged two years.  
We include the two year lagged solvency ratio in our model.
50
 Berry-Stölzle, 
Koissi and Shapiro (2010) find a significant positive relationship between the solvency 
ratio and its two year lag for German property-liability insurers. We examine if this 
finding holds in times of economic downturn. Kramer (1996) includes the prior 
solvency as well and results indicating a strong relation to insurers’ current financial 
strength. Moreover, Cummins and Nini (2002) state that safer insurance companies can 
demand higher prices as insurance prices proxy for insolvency risk (Sommer, 1996), 
and thus keep their solvency ratios on high levels.  
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 The use of lagged variables to detect factors that influence insurers’ solvency proved to be successful in 
several related studies, as for example Barrese (1990) who finds the two-year reserve development as 
strong predictor of insurer distress. 
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Furthermore, we examine the impact of Investment Risk on insurers’ solvency 
ratio. Given the turmoil in the financial markets during the financial crisis, insurers with 
a high proportion of volatile financial assets and real estate and thus a high exposure to 
market risks might have financially suffered more from the downturn. Hence, their 
equity base and their solvency might have been negatively affected. Harrington and 
Nelson (1986) provide evidence that the proportion of stocks negatively affects the 
insurers’ financial strength. Cummins and Nini (2002) state that insurers with a higher 
proportion of stocks and real estate hold more capital in order to compensate for higher 
asset risks and should thus show higher degrees of solvency. However, German insurers 
are required by law to engage in safe and diversified investments and are not permitted 
to engage in speculative or risky business, making their investments relatively safe. To 
measure Investment Risk we use the percentage of stocks and real estate in the 
investment portfolio. 
Moreover, we examine the impact of Premium Growth on insurer solvency. 
High premium growth is associated with an increase in the company’s risk, as an 
aggressive growth strategy could increase the risk of insolvency (For example, U.S. 
General Accounting Office, (1989), Kim et al. (1995), Lee and Urrutia (1996)). In 
particular, excessive growth is a problem in times of economic downturn (For example 
during the Asian Financial Crisis, see Chen and Wong 2004). If the firm takes on 
substantial risks by increasing premium income, for example by underpricing, and 
thereby its market share it might not be able to bear the financial consequences in case 
of unfavorable development in the short run due to under reserving, even though such a 
strategy might pay off in the long run. This could lead to a higher risk of insolvency. 
Thus, the solvency of insurers with aggressive growth strategies might have deteriorated 
during the financial crisis. Premium Growth as included in our analysis is the year-on-
year percentage change in net written premiums. 
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Additionally, we include a set of control variables in our regression model, 
denoted by Xi. Chen and Wong (2004), Cummins, Grace and Phillips (1999) and 
Cummins, Harrington and Klein (1995) find that larger property-liability insurers have 
stronger solvency. Hence, the vector of control variables includes a measure of insurer 
size. We measure size as the natural logarithm of the insurers’ total assets.  
BarNiv and McDonalds (1992), Trieschmann and Pinches (1973) and Lee and 
Urrutia (1996) use operational leverage as a proxy for the firm’s sales aggressiveness 
and show that higher operational leverage leads to lower solvency of property-liability 
insurers. The Operational Leverage is measured as the ratio of net premiums written 
and equity capital. 
Insurers with higher profitability should have a lower risk of decreasing 
solvency, because premium and investment income excess the claims and other 
expenses and therefore positively influence the company’s equity and solvency. 
Moreover, a high degree of profitability might indicate efficient management and 
therefore lower risks, leading to lower risk of insolvency (BarNiv and McDonald, 
1992). Therefore, we include the Return on Asset measured as the ratio of net income 
and total assets in our analysis. 
Eck (1982), Chen and Wong (2004) and Sharpe and Stadnik (2007) show that 
the combined ratio as an overall measure of the cost of providing insurance coverage 
negatively affects insurer solvency. We include the Combined Ratio measured as the 
ratio of the sum of losses and expenses and earned premium in our analysis.  
Moreover, we control for insurers’ business mix because more diversified 
insurers might be less likely to suffer from financial distress (Sommer, 1996; Berry-
Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro, 2010). However, if it writes business in lines in which it is 
not competitive and/or in high-risk lines without having the knowledge to properly price 
and underwrite the exposures it assumes, then this could negatively affect its solvency. 
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We measure line of business diversification by including the Herfindahl Index based on 
gross premiums earned in the respective line of business in our analysis.
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Following agency and adverse selection theory, Lamm-Tennant and Starks 
(1993) provide evidence that mutual insurers take less risk than stock insurers and that 
stock insurers write relatively more business in lines with higher risk. Therefore, stock 
insurers should have a higher probability of insolvency than mutual insurers. Given 
their organizational structure, the incentive to increase risks after issuing their policies 
should be much lower for mutual insurers than for stock insurers. Cummins, Harrington 
and Klein (1995) and Cummins, Grace and Phillips (1999) include a dummy variable 
for mutual insurers in their prediction models and find that being a mutual insurer 
negatively affects the probability of insolvency. Another organizational form that might 
influence the insurers’ solvency in Germany are public insurers, insurers which are 
under public law.
52
 Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro (2010) include a dummy variable 
for public insurers as they might have an incentive to write relatively more business 
given the fact that the government could bail them out in case of financial distress as 
they are owned by local and state authorities. Therefore, their solvency ratios might be 
lower. However, public insurers cannot raise money from the capital markets and since 
their mandate is to provide reliable insurance coverage and they are owned by public 
institutions they might have higher solvency ratios than stock insurers. We include two 
indicator variables in our analysis: Mutual is a dummy variable (1 indicating the insurer 
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We follow Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro (2010) and define the Herfindahl index as Σai
2
/( Σai)
2
, 
where ai represents the gross premiums earned in business line i. The calculation uses premium data 
reported in the insurance companies’ annual reports for the following lines of business: Personal 
Accident, Liability, Auto Liability, Other Auto, Fire, Homeowners Personal Property, Residential and 
Commercial Building Damage, Transportation and Aircraft, Legal Expenses, Credit and Collateral and 
Others. 
52
 Public insurers are founded as non-profit organizations under public law to serve a certain region or 
administrative district; they can be owned by public institutions like cities, counties, states, other public 
insurers or municipal savings banks which are non-profit organizations under public law as well. 
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is organized as a mutual insurer and 0 otherwise). Public is a dummy variable (1 
indicating the insurer is organized as a public insurer and 0 otherwise).
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3.4.4 Prediction Quality 
In addition, we examine to what extend these factors are able to predict the 
future solvency ratio of the respective firm correctly. We thereby verify whether our 
prediction model correctly classifies insurers according to their financial strength, even 
in times of crisis. For this purpose we use a logistic regression model. As our dataset 
does not contain insolvencies, we follow Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro (2010), 
Sharpe and Stadnik (2007) and Kramer (1996) and predict the insurers’ solvency ratio. 
Hence, our prediction model aims to identify insurance companies that can be seen as 
financially distressed from the regulator’s perspective two years in advance.  
Regarding the fact that German insurers are well capitalized, the early 
identification of financially distressed insurers in the absence of insolvencies is 
arbitrary. We know that the BaFin takes regulatory action in case the company’s 
regulatory solvency ratio falls below 100% and 33%, respectively (para. 81b sec. 1 
VAG). To examine whether our model is able to detect these companies early enough 
before falling under the 100% criteria we follow Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro 
(2010) and classify insurers into financially weak and strong based on whether their 
solvency ratio is below or above a specific reference point. Thus, even relatively 
financially weak companies in our sample are on average well capitalized and meet the 
100% criteria of the BaFin easily. Hence, it remains subjective at which magnitude of 
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 Previous literature on solvency prediction includes a vast amount of additional factors that have been 
tested regarding their impact on insurer solvency. For example, Grace, Harrington and Klein (1998) and 
Cummins, Grace and Phillips (1999) include larger set of variables, including regulatory RBC and FAST 
ratios. However, given the data availability provided by the German insurance regulation, we cannot 
include these kind of factors in our analysis. Furthermore, we used different ratios for our control 
variables in additional regression analyses. The unreported results show no significant differences to the 
results presented in this paper. In addition, several factors that might affect insurer solvency like falsified 
financial statements or mismanagement could not been included in our model due to a lack of data. 
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the solvency ratio the insurer can be regarded as endangered. Therefore, we run three 
different prediction models using different intervals of financial distress in order to 
provide results for different levels of regulatory intervention.
54
 We start with a rather 
broad definition of financial distress in order to identify endangered companies and 
subsequently seek to understand how precise our predictions are for companies with 
lower solvency ratio levels. We estimate the following logit model: 
Financially Endangeredi,t = β1 Ln(solvency ratio)i,t-2 + β2 Investment Riski,t-2   
+ β3 Premium Growthi,t -2 + γ’Xi,t-2 + εi,t-2 
(4) 
Financially Endangered is a dummy variable equal to one if we classify the 
insurer as endangered regarding our definition of financial distress and zero otherwise. 
The right hand side variables are identical to the variables described in equation (3). 
We first define Financially Endangered companies as those having a solvency 
ratio of less than 200%. Second, we use a solvency ratio of 175% in order to distinguish 
between endangered and not endangered companies. Third, we use 150% as a cut-off 
point. We do not use a solvency ratio of 100% or lower as an indicator for endangered 
companies as this would be too narrow a definition of financial distress, regarding the 
fact that companies with less than 150% of the required solvency ratio can quickly fall 
below 100% in case of unexpected events.  
Hence, we estimate three logit models using the above definitions of Financially 
Endangered companies. We drop mutuals and public insurers in the prediction model 
because both explain the financially not endangered category perfectly. Thus, the 
number of observations in the Prediction Quality Model is smaller than in the Solvency 
Prediction Model. An observation is classified correctly using a cutoff point of 50% for 
the predicted probability. Wrong classifications can be interpreted as type I and type II 
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 Thus, our methodology is similar to the U.S. RBC Authorized Control Levels that represent different 
levels of insurer capital holdings (200%, 150%, 100%, 70%).  
56 
 
errors, indicating potential costs of misclassifying insurers (BarNiv and McDonald, 
1992). 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Solvency Prediction Model 
Table 9 presents the OLS regression results for each year from 2006 through 
2011 separately. The R-squared for all models is above 0.887 indicating a good model 
fit. This holds even in times of financial crisis. The factors included in our prediction 
model are thus able to assess the insurers’ regulatory solvency regardless of the 
economic circumstances. This holds in particular for the lagged solvency ratio. 
Consistent with Berry-Stölzle, Koissi and Shapiro (2010), we find the lagged solvency 
ratio to be a strong predictor for the future solvency ratio in each period, regardless of 
the macroeconomic conditions. The lagged solvency ratio is significant at the one 
percent level in all years. The effect of the lagged solvency ratio on the current solvency 
ratio is much stronger in all years in comparison to Premium Growth and Investment 
Risk. We thus conclude that the lagged solvency ratio is an appropriate indicator of the 
insurers’ future solvency ratio. 
Table 10 supports this assumption, showing the results of our solvency 
prediction model when the lagged solvency ratio is excluded. It can be seen that this 
leads to a significant loss of explanatory power. The adjusted R-squared strongly 
decreases while in addition the Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz information criteria (BIC)
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indicate that the exclusion of the lagged solvency ratio leads to significantly worse 
estimation results. The insurers’ solvency ratio is now mostly explained by Operational 
Leverage and the organizational form. Hence, our results provide evidence that the 
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 Lower AIC and BIC values indicate a better fit of the model. See Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978). 
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current regulatory approach can successfully identify financially weak insurers based on 
their current solvency ratio. 
Table 9 Regressions of ln(solvency ratio) on Insurers Characteristics 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Ln(solvency ratio)t-2 0.928*** 0.974*** 0.903*** 0.866*** 0.882*** 0.812*** 
 (0.043) (0.058) (0.051) (0.040) (0.038) (0.071) 
Investment Riskt-2 0.742** -0.016 -0.119*** -0.066** 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.138) (0.120) (0.136) (0.114) (0.135) (0.157) 
Premium Growtht-2 -0.105** -0.139*** -0.102*** -0.083*** -0.025 -0.011 
 (0.174) (0.339) (0.169) (0.173) (0.137) (0.122) 
Ln(Assets)t-2 -0.024 -0.095** -0.056 0.048 0.092** 0.055 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) 
Operational Leveraget-2 0.155*** 0.092** -0.047 -0.050 0.051** -0.094 
 (0.001) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.003) (0.041) 
ROAt-2 0.039 -0.004 -0.079 -0.087** -0.025 -0.027 
 (1.054) (1.034) (1.006) (0.878) (0.841) (0.920) 
Combined Ratiot-2 -0.062 -0.100 -0.052 -0.060 -0.066 -0.101 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Herfindahl Indext-2 0.017 0.018 0.030 0.069** 0.038 0.025 
 (0.094) (0.112) (0.069) (0.073) (0.093) (0.111) 
Indicator: Mutualt-2 -0.008 0.050 0.135*** 0.132*** 0.094*** 0.070** 
 (0.054) (0.083) (0.078) (0.070) (0.061) (0.065) 
Indicator: Publict-2 0.006 0.085 0.060 0.050* 0.040 -0.023 
 (0.066) (0.137) (0.103) (0.060) (0.063) (0.151) 
AIC -4.939 14.308 -23.927 -46.995 -33.225 4.573 
BIC 23.935 43.290 5.266 -18.120 -4.568 32.313 
R-squared 0.897 0.886 0.919 0.932 0.925 0.891 
Adjusted R-squared 0.886 0.874 0.911 0.924 0.916 0.877 
Observations 102 103 105 102 100 92 
Note: This table reports estimated coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression with ln(solvency 
ratio) as the dependent variable using standardized regression coefficients. All independent variables are 
measured at of the end of the period two years ago and are described in Table 8. The table reports five 
different models. The second column reports the model using ln(solvency ratio) as dependent variable 
based on 2006 data and all independent variables based on 2004 data. The third column reports the model 
using ln(solvency ratio) as dependent variable based on 2007 data and all independent variables based on 
2005 data. The following columns are estimated for the dependent and independent variables vice versa. 
AIC and BIC refer to the test statistics for the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria, respectively. 
Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 Regressions of ln(solvency ratio) on Insurers Characteristics excluding 
the Lagged Solvency Ratio 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Investment Riskt-2 0.201* 0.086 0.034 0.118* 0.150* 0.050 
 (0.421) (0.278) (0.290) (0.255) (0.362) (0.274) 
Premium Growtht-2 -0.081 -0.121 -0.077 -0.073 -0.086 -0.003 
 (0.278) (0.588) (0.259) (0.358) (0.328) (0.168) 
Ln(Assets)t-2 0.202* 0.165* 0.185** 0.182** 0.154 0.258*** 
 (0.054) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.037) 
Operational Leveraget-2 -0.074 -0.493*** -0.534*** -0.492*** -0.128 -0.600*** 
 (0.002) (0.051) (0.061) (0.071) (0.022) (0.051) 
ROAt-2 0.031 0.150 0.045 -0.054 -0.122 0.008 
 (3.354) (2.336) (2.667) (1.964) (1.819) (1.364) 
Combined Ratiot-2 -0.281 -0.073 -0.081 -0.177 -0.350*** -0.172 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Herfindahl Indext-2 0.036 0.040 0.037 0.033 0.040 0.059 
 (0.223) (0.203) (0.192) (0.186) (0.197) (0.161) 
Indicator: Mutualt-2 0.275** 0.229** 0.283*** 0.292*** 0.391*** 0.219** 
 (0.302) (0.218) (0.222) (0.223) (0.256) (0.185) 
Indicator: Publict-2 0.187** 0.124** 0.120* 0.133** 0.184** 0.022 
 (0.178) (0.148) (0.158) (0.129) (0.186) (0.182) 
AIC 174.077 147.659 141.589 127.333 165.432 106.691 
BIC 200.326 174.007 168.129 153.583 191.484 131.909 
R-squared 0.394 0.577 0.603 0.617 0.439 0.662 
Adjusted R-squared 0.334 0.536 0.565 0.579 0.383 0.625 
Observations 102 103 105 102 100 92 
Note: This table reports estimated coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression with ln(solvency 
ratio) as the dependent variable using standardized regression coefficients. All independent variables are 
measured at of the end of the period two years ago and are described in Table 8, except ln(solvency ratio) 
that is excluded in this regression. The table reports five different models. The second column reports the 
model using ln(solvency ratio) as dependent variable based on 2006 data and all independent variables 
based on 2004 data. The third column reports the model using ln(solvency ratio) as dependent variable 
based on 2007 data and all independent variables based on 2005 data. The following columns are 
estimated for the dependent and independent variables vice versa. AIC and BIC refer to the test statistics 
for the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria, respectively. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
Moreover, Table 9 shows a significant negative relationship between Investment 
Risk and financial strength only for the years 2008 and 2009. Thus, the solvency ratio of 
insurers that hold a larger proportion of their assets in stocks and real estate was 
negatively influenced during the financial crisis.  
The results are furthermore consistent with Chen and Wong (2004) as higher 
Premium Growth leads to weaker financial strength in 2008 and 2009, indicating that an 
aggressive growth strategy negatively influences the insurers’ solvency in times of 
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economic downturn. Moreover, Premium Growth is significant and negative in the 
years 2006 and 2007 as well. Hence, the negative impact of aggressive growth strategies 
in the German insurance market cannot be restricted to times of financial crisis, but also 
holds during the years preceding the crisis. 
 
3.5.2 Prediction Quality 
Table 11 shows the classification results for the logit model using different 
degrees of solvency ratios as a proxy for the insurers’ financial situation. In Panel A, 
companies are defined as endangered if their solvency ratio is below 200% of the 
required solvency. Panel B and C use 175% and 150%, respectively, in order to define 
financially endangered insurers. The table shows the amount of insurers that were 
classified correctly (or incorrectly) as well as the overall percentage of correctly 
classified insurers for each year separately. 
The results indicate that the model is able to correctly classify the vast majority 
of insurers according to their financial strength. Table 11 shows that in each year, at 
least 84% of the insurers are classified correctly by our model. The classification results 
remain on a high level over time and are not influenced by the financial crisis. Thus, the 
financial strength of German insurers can be classified with a high degree of accuracy 
even in times of crisis.   
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Table 11 Classification results 
Panel A (200%) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Correctly classified as healthy 56 46 45 61 59 43 
Incorrectly classified as healthy 4 7 7 6 5 6 
Correctly classified as endangered 19 23 28 12 13 18 
Incorrectly classified as endangered 6 8 6 4 4 6 
Total 85 84 86 83 81 73 
Correctly predicted 88.24% 82.14% 84.88% 87.95% 88.89% 83.56% 
       
Panel B (175%) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Correctly classified as healthy 65 61 59 72 70 59 
Incorrectly classified as healthy 3 7 9 2 0 2 
Correctly classified as endangered 14 13 13 8 11 9 
Incorrectly classified as endangered 3 3 5 1 0 3 
Total 85 85 86 83 81 73 
Correctly predicted 92.94% 88.10% 84.71% 96.39% 100.00% 93.15% 
       
Panel C (150%) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Correctly classified as healthy 78 70 74 77 76 68 
Incorrectly classified as healthy 0 5 5 0 0 3 
Correctly classified as endangered 7 8 6 6 5 1 
Incorrectly classified as endangered 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Total 85 85 86 83 81 73 
Correctly predicted 100.00% 92.86% 93.02% 100.00% 100.00 % 94.52% 
Note: Panel A shows the classification table of the two years lagged insurer characteristics as described in 
Table 8 using a logistic regression with a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s solvency ratio is 
above 200% and zero otherwise as dependent variable. An observation was classified as correctly 
respectively incorrectly classified using a cutoff point of 50% for the predicted probability. Panel B is 
equivalent to Panel A except the fact that we use a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s solvency 
ratio is above 175% and zero otherwise as dependent variable. Panel C is equivalent to Panel A except the 
fact that we use a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s solvency ratio is above 150% and zero 
otherwise as dependent variable. 
Furthermore, the results show that the model is particularly precise in detecting 
endangered insurers with solvency ratios close to the required minimum solvency ratio. 
Panel C shows that the model can classify companies with solvency ratios of less than 
150% with at least 92.86% accuracy in each year. The amount of correctly predicted 
companies in Panel A and Panel B is lower in each period. Hence, seriously financially 
endangered insurers can be detected two years in advance with a high degree of 
accuracy, leaving time to take regulatory actions in order to protect the policyholder’s 
interests. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
The need for reliable solvency prediction models for insurance companies arises 
from asymmetric information problems in the insurance market. Due to costly 
information and agency problems, consumers are hardly able to properly assess the 
insurers’ financial strength before purchasing insurance coverage. Particularly during 
times of economic downtown, reliable solvency prediction models are needed to protect 
policyholders’ interests. We question how reliably insurance regulators can assess the 
financial strength of German property-liability insurers, especially in times of financial 
crisis.  
This research examines the factors that affect the insurers’ regulatory solvency 
ratio, focusing on times of economic downturns over the period from 2004 through 
2011 using company-level data of German property-liability insurers. Furthermore, we 
develop a prediction model for German property-liability insurers, following the 
regulators approach that allows us to classify the insurers regarding their financial 
strength.  
We use the solvency ratio as defined by German law as a proxy for the insurers’ 
solvency ratio. Our results suggest that the prior solvency ratio is a reliable indicator of 
the insurers’ future solvency ratio even in times of financial crisis. Moreover, we find 
that high premium growth can lead to a deterioration of the insurers’ solvency in an 
economic downturn, but also in the years surrounding the crisis. In addition, we show 
that investment risk is negligible for the solvency of German insurers compared to prior 
solvency ratios. Furthermore, we have developed a prediction model that classifies the 
vast majority of the insurers correctly according to their financial strength. The 
classification results remain constant and show a strong ability to predict correctly even 
in times of financial crisis.  
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This research has important public policy implications. We show that in 
particular the lagged solvency ratio can be used to predict the future solvency ratio 
regardless of the economic conditions. Thus, our results imply that regulators are able to 
detect insurers that are financially distressed early enough to take appropriate action to 
protect policyholder’s interests, even in times of economic downturn. We contribute to 
the literature on insurance regulation, as our results indicate a high degree of stability in 
the German property-liability insurance sector, even during economic downturns. The 
industry was able to bear the consequences of the financial crisis given the current 
regulatory system. However, given that our analysis focused mainly on capital 
requirements, the regulatory system could still be improved by a modernization that 
takes into account additional perspectives other than regulatory capital. Hence, because 
our analysis is based on Solvency I requirements, further research is needed after the 
adoption of Solvency II.  
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4 Policy Interventions and Banking Shocks: Evidence from the 
Insurance Sector 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We analyze the impact of monetary policy interventions during the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 and banking-sector shocks on the stock prices of U.S. insurance firms. We 
use an event study methodology and a database of 89 policy announcements to analyze 
if such measures could restore stability in the insurance sector. In addition, we analyze 
the stock market response of insurers towards 10 banking sector events (bailouts and 
frauds). Our results indicate that different types of policy interventions led to diverse 
market reactions. Moreover, our results also show that insurers are highly exposed to 
shocks from the banking sector. In addition, we conduct a second stage analysis to 
examine firm level determinants of the insurers’ stock price responses, finding that 
various factors affect the insurers reaction to banking shocks and policy interventions. 
Our results are valuable from a policymaker’s perspective regarding the effectiveness of 
policy interventions in times of crisis and for investors of insurance firms regarding the 
diversification benefits of their investment portfolio. 
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4.1 Introduction  
The financial crises of 2007-2009 exposed systemic linkages throughout the 
financial sectors of the economy. Given the effects of the Lehman failure on the overall 
financial sector, we know that major shocks from the banking sector affected companies 
from other sectors, and in particular insurance firms (Cummins and Weiss, 2014; 
Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons, 2011). To mitigate the consequences of the crises, 
policymakers around the world responded with a wide-ranging set of interventions. 
Apart from “conventional” measures such as interest rate decreases, their interventions 
comprised a set of “non-conventional” measures such as monetary easing and liquidity 
provision. The primary target of these interventions was to restore the stability of the 
financial and the banking sector (Ricci, 2015; Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci, 2014). 
Previous papers examine the effectiveness of such measures regarding their ability to 
address the fragility of the banking sector and to restore confidence in financial markets 
(Aït-Sahalia, et al., 2012). However, how these measures affected firms from the 
insurance sector is an open question. In addition, despite the role of the Lehman failure 
for the outbreak of the financial crisis, knowledge on the impact of shocks from the 
banking sector on insurance firms is likewise limited. 
In this research, we examine the impact of banking shocks and monetary policy 
interventions during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 on the stock prices of firms from 
the U.S. insurance sector. In particular, central banks around the world became major 
actors in restoring stability in the aftermath of the financial crisis, hence knowledge on 
the effectiveness of their measures regarding their ability to stabilize sectors provides 
valuable knowledge from a policymaker’s perspective. However, while previous papers 
analyze the impact of policymakers’ interventions on banks (Ricci, 2015), interbank risk 
permia (Aït-Sahalia et al., 2012) and aggregate markets (Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci, 
2014), research on the effectiveness of non-conventional measures regarding their 
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ability to stabilize the insurance sector does not exist. Given that previous papers 
showed that the insurance sector has been strongly affected by the financial crisis that 
originated in the banking sector (Cummins and Weiss, 2014; Baluch, Mutenga and 
Parsons, 2011),
56
 knowledge on the type of interventions that can restore the stability in 
the insurance sector is valuable for regulators, managers and policyholders of insurance 
firms. In addition, previous papers showed that the impact of different types of 
interventions differed between banks, aggregate markets and risk premia (Ricci, 2015; 
Aït-Sahalia et al., 2012; Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci, 2014). Hence, the findings of 
previous papers might not be directly applicable to the insurance sector. 
Moreover, apart from non-conventional measures, central banks intervene 
regularly in the markets through conventional measures, such as changes in interest 
rates. Specifically, during the crisis, central banks around the world reduced interest 
rates to unprecedented low levels to promote economic activity and mitigate the 
consequences of the crisis. Such monetary announcements affect aggregate stock 
markets (e.g. Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005), interest rates (e.g. León and Sebestyén, 
2012) and in particular banks, given their interest-sensitive business models (e.g. 
Madura and Schnusenberg, 2000; Yin, Yang and Handorf, 2010; Yin and Yang, 2010; 
Kim, Wu and Lee, 2013). However, and somewhat surprisingly, the impact of central 
banks’ interest rate decision on insurers has not been analyzed yet. Given the interest-
rate sensitivity of insurance firms (Brewer III et al., 2007) and the fact that previous 
papers found a significant effect of such decisions on firms from the banking sector, 
such policy interventions are also quite likely to affect insurance firms, especially those 
with assets and liabilities exposed to interest rate risk. Knowledge on the impact of the 
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 For example, the life insurance stock price index lost 85% of value during the crisis, and the property-
casualty index lost 58%. Moreover, the life insurer failure rate five folded during the crisis (Cummins and 
Weiss, 2014). In addition, Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons (2011) state that the impact of the banking crisis 
on insurers has been uneven, given that some parts of the insurance markets have been affected fairly 
severe, while other sectors remained unaffected. 
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Federal Reserve’s (FED) interest rate decisions provides valuable knowledge regarding 
the effectiveness of the central bank’s policy decisions and insurers’ exposure towards 
such announcements. 
Analyzing conventional and non-conventional policy measures regarding their 
ability to affect insurance firms during the crisis will shed light on their effectiveness to 
counteract a shock that originated from the banking sector. However, knowledge on the 
general impact of shocks from the banking sector on the stock price of insurance firms 
is limited. Given that the financial crisis was largely caused by an idiosyncratic shock 
from the banking sector, we will provide valuable evidence on the general exposure of 
insurance firms from shocks arising from the banking sector. Billio et al. (2012) and 
Chen et al. (2014) develop measures of interconnectedness in the overall financial 
sector based on financial market data. They find a high degree of interconnectedness 
and that the relative impact of banks on insurers’ results is much stronger than the 
reverse.
57
 However, these measures of interconnectedness do not evaluate 
interconnectedness with respect to single, sector-specific events. Instead, they focus on 
measuring interconnectedness in a given time period
58
 but they do not analyze the effect 
of shocks such as extremely severe single events like banking bailouts and financial 
frauds. However, such events have been shown to spill over to other banks (e.g. 
Hryckiewicz, 2014; Cummins, Lewis and Wei, 2006). Given the interconnectedness 
between different types of institutions in the financial sector, such events are likely to 
affect insurance firms. In addition, Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011) show that 
insurance-related events such as natural catastrophes and terror attacks affect the stock 
                                                          
57
 These papers analyze the interconnectedness of the financial industry from a systemic risk perspective. 
See Acharya et al. (2010) regarding additional background on systemic risk in the banking sector and 
Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons (2011) and Cummins and Weiss (2014) for additional information on 
systemic risk in the insurance sector. 
58
 E.g. the price of insurance against distressed losses over the next three months, Chen et al. (2013), and 
a systemic risk measure based on monthly stock returns, Billio et al. (2012). 
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prices of insurers, but banks remain mostly unaffected. This shows that investors can 
diversify idiosyncratic, insurance-related shocks away, for example by holding bank 
stocks. However, knowledge about the impact of shocks from the banking sector on 
insurance firms is limited. Hence, in addition to the policy interventions aiming to 
counteract the recent banking crisis, we also analyze the impact of banking-sector 
events (banking bailouts and trading frauds) that can cause turmoil in financial markets 
on the stock price of insurance firms. 
We follow related papers (Ricci, 2015; Aït-Sahalia et al., 2012; Fiordelisi, 
Galloppo and Ricci, 2014; Cummins, Lewis and Wei, 2006) and measure the effect of 
monetary policy announcements and banking-related events on the stock market 
performance of insurance firms using an event study methodology. In addition, we 
conduct a second stage analyses to identify the individual firms’ determinants of their 
stock market response. This analysis provides evidence on the types of firms and 
business models that are more sensitive to both banking shocks and policy 
announcements from an investor’s perspective 
To examine the insurers’ stock price response towards policy announcements 
and banking events, we use a detailed, hand-collected database of central bank policy 
initiatives during and in the aftermath of the recent crisis (based on Aït-Sahalia et al., 
2012) and banking bailouts and frauds between 2002 and 2012. For our empirical 
analyses, we use stock market and accounting data for listed U.S. insurance firms 
during that period. This creates a dataset of 89 policy announcements and 10 banking-
sector events. Our results can be summarized as follows: Shocks from the banking 
sector do affect firms from the insurance sector. The impact and direction depends on 
the content of the shock and is state dependent, that is, depending on the economic 
conditions. However, the consequences of such shocks can be mitigated by adequate 
policy interventions, given that most measures positively affected the stock prices of 
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insurers. In particular, we find financial sector policies (e.g. liability guarantees) and 
liquidity support had a positive effect on insurance firms. 
Our results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, our paper is the first to examine the impact of non-conventional policy 
announcements on firms from the insurance sector during the recent financial crisis. 
This provides valuable policy insights, as it is possible to examine how such measures 
affect an important part of the financial system, i.e. the insurance sector. As a primary 
responsibility of insurance regulation is to protect policyholders against the default of 
insurance firms (Klein, 1995), this research provides valuable insights on how policy 
interventions affect this goal. Moreover, we add to the literature an analysis on how 
conventional central bank announcements affect insurance firms. Given their interest-
rate sensitivity (Brewer III et al., 2007), this provides valuable knowledge for managers 
and regulators in the insurance sector. In addition, our findings are highly relevant for 
investors regarding their portfolio diversification of financial sector stocks. Chesney, 
Reshetar and Karaman (2011) show that investors can diversify away idiosyncratic 
shocks from the insurance sector by holding bank stocks, as they are not affected by 
insurance sector-specific events. However, given that insurance stock price reactions are 
strongly affected by shocks from the banking sector, these assets are not suitable to 
diversify bank-specific risk.
59
 Given the increasing magnitude and number of such 
exogenous, sector-specific events in recent years, understanding their effects on 
insurance firms provides valuable knowledge for investors, managers and regulators of 
these firms. Moreover, we contribute to the literature on interconnectedness in the 
financial industry. While previous studies (Billio et al., 2012 and Chen et al., 2014) do 
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 This is in particular valuable for investors that fail to diversify their stock investments in a way which is 
recommended by portfolio theory. For example, employees of financial firms hold most of their wealth in 
one financial firm due to stock options or pension plans. Thus, by being exposed to the idiosyncratic risk 
of their firm, they bear more risk than rewarded by the returns of their stocks (Campbell et al., 2001). 
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not analyze the interconnectedness of insurers with the banking sector regarding major 
banking-specific events, we contribute to the literature by showing that insurance firms 
are strongly affected by such shocks, thereby indicating a high degree of 
interconnectedness.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a summary of the 
background and previous literature on policy interventions, banking shocks and 
interconnectedness in the financial sector. The following section describes the data and 
methodology used in our analysis, and the ensuing section presents the results. The final 
section concludes. 
 
4.2 Background and Previous Literature 
In this section we discuss three related strands of literature as they relate to our 
empirical tests and discussion. First, we provide background on the effect of policy 
announcements on the financial sector. Second, we examine evidence of how sector 
specific events particularly affected banks. Third, we review the literature on 
interconnectedness in the financial sector. 
 
4.2.1 The Impact of Central Bank and other Policy Announcements on 
Financial Firms 
The stock price reaction to announcements of central banks has been widely 
discussed in the literature, in particular for aggregate stock markets and banks. 
Monetary policy advocates believe that changes in interest rates affect asset prices and 
returns and therefore have a direct effect on stock prices.
60
 For banks, interest income 
and expenses are highly correlated with interest rates, and loan demand changes in 
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 From an asset pricing perspective, the value of an asset is determined by the present value of its future 
cash flows. Thus, a firm’s market value reflects the present value of the dividends generated by its 
business activities. For financial firms, the revenue, expenses and gains (losses) on securities are all 
affected by interest rates and therefore are affected by monetary policy. 
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accordance with the level of interest rates (Yin, Yang and Handorf, 2010). Similarly, 
insurance firms’ (in particular, life insurers’) assets and liabilities are highly interest rate 
sensitive (Brewer III et al., 2007). The degree of exposure of banks’ and insurers’ stock 
prices to interest rate risk depends on the duration gap between its assets and liabilities 
(Papadamou and Siriopoulos, 2014). However, previous literature indicates an inverse 
relation between interest rates and the stock prices of banks (e.g. Madura and 
Schnusenberg, 2000; Yin, Yang and Handorf, 2010) and life insurers (Brewer III et al., 
2007).
61
 While the relation between central bank announcements and bank stock prices 
has been extensively studied in the literature, research on the impact of interest rates on 
insurance firms’ stock prices is limited (Papadamou and Siriopoulos, 2014; Brewer III 
et al., 2007). Studies that analyze the impact of central bank interest rate announcements 
on insurance firms do not exist. Moreover, previous papers find that stock price 
reactions to central bank announcements can be state dependent, that is, depending on 
changes in the economic conditions (Yin, Yang and Handorf, 2010). Hence, we 
examine how such announcements affect insurance firms during different stages of the 
recent financial crisis.
62
 
In addition to “conventional” central bank announcements containing interest 
rate decisions, central banks and other policymakers intervened the market during the 
crisis of 2007-2009 using a large set of “non-conventional” policy announcements (for 
example, monetary easing). Their primary goal was to restore monetary stability and 
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 Apart from interest rate sensitivity of the firms’ business models, asset pricing theory postulates that 
interest rate changes affect firms’ stock prices via bond markets by affecting investors’ required rate of 
return: changes in interest rates affect market rates and bond returns (e.g. Cook and Hahn, 1989; Kuttner, 
2001; Roley and Sellon, 1995). This in turn affects stockholders’ required rates of returns in relation to 
these alternative investment opportunities and therefore stock valuations. 
62
 The content of such announcements needs to be unexpected in order to affect stock prices (Bernanke 
and Kuttner, 2005; León and Sebestyén, 2012). In case investors anticipate the outcome correctly, the 
impact on interest rates should already be considered in asset prices. Moreover, the impact of such 
announcements does not only depend on the decision to change interest rate and the extent of this change, 
but also on the rationale of this decision and the central bank’s communication. See León and Sebestyén 
(2012) for a comprehensive literature review. 
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thus increase the stability of the banking system and the overall financial sector (Ricci, 
2015). The announcements contained measures that aimed to support funding 
conditions for banks in order to ensure lending to the overall economy and to reduce the 
threat of contagion in financial markets (Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci, 2014; ECB, 
2011). The use of such measures was a primary response to the crisis and strongly 
affected the structure of the financial market. For example, central banks mostly 
replaced the interbank market in times of extremely high uncertainty and turmoil. The 
policy announcements were highly heterogeneous in type, and therefore their impact on 
stock prices is likely to vary across type of measure. In general, given their aim was to 
restore stability and the experience from previous crises, such announcements are 
expected to have a calming (positive) effect on financial markets (Aït-Sahalia et al., 
2012; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). For example, monetary easing programs are 
expected to reduce credit and liquidity risk premia, given that such measures relieve 
funding pressures and reduce counterparty risk. However, though policy announcements 
aim to calm financial markets, they can have adverse effects as they increase concerns 
about the soundness of the financial markets. In this case, they are considered as bad 
news for investors. This might trigger negative stock market reactions. In addition, 
analogous to conventional announcements, the effect of non-conventional policy 
announcements can be state contingent, as investors might advocate certain measures in 
times of crises as they can stabilize the endangered financial system and therefore 
outweigh fears of higher uncertainty in the markets. For example, Ricci (2015) finds 
that liquidity provisions negatively affected bank stock prices during the financial crisis, 
but positively in the aftermath. Previous papers focused on the question of what type of 
policy response is effective in times of crises. Given the substantial resources devoted to 
such measures, research on the impact of their interventions provides valuable insights 
from a policymaker’s perspective. In addition, given the heterogeneity of their 
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interventions, their impact can vary across type of policy for different sectors and 
indices. Hence, previous papers analyze the impact of policy announcements during the 
crisis on a variety of industries, aggregate markets and measures of risk in the financial 
markets. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) use an event study methodology to analyze the impact 
of financial sector announcements from different countries during the recent crisis on 
interbank credit and liquidity risk premia. They find that such measures overall reduced 
interbank risk premia, and that such interventions had international spillovers. 
Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci (2014) and Ricci (2015) extend this research by 
analyzing the effect of policy announcements on aggregate stock markets, global 
systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) and European banks. Their 
results indicate that such measures can affect both aggregate markets and banks, and 
that the effect strongly depends on the type of intervention and the stage of the crisis. 
 
4.2.2 Analyses of Sector Specific Events in the Banking Industry  
The effect of bailouts on banks: A vast amount of studies analyze the effects of 
bank bailouts on firms from the banking sector. From a theoretical perspective, the 
literature discusses two opposite effects of bailouts: First, bailouts increase the banks’ 
level of safety due to increases in charter values (Cordella and Yehati, 2003). Keeley 
(1990) shows that higher charter values decrease the banks’ incentive to engage in 
extremely risky activities, given the lower risk of losing future rents. In addition, 
proponents of government interventions state that regulatory interventions restore 
confidence in the banking sector, hence positively affecting firms from the banking 
sector (Hryckiewicz, 2014). Moreover, bailouts strengthen the bank’s monitoring 
incentives (Mehran and Thakor, 2011). On the other hand, they might increase the 
bank’s riskiness as they induce moral hazard in the banking sector due to the 
anticipation of bailouts (Hryckiewicz, 2014). This decreases market discipline in the 
73 
 
sector and thus lowers incentives to monitor banks (Gropp, Hakenes and Schnabel, 
2011). Duchin and Sosyura (2014) state that government interventions in the banking 
sector provide banks with a put option on their assets on the guarantor. They find that 
bailouts make the banking sector more risky, as bailed-out banks shift their investments 
towards riskier assets. Overall, the consequences of bailouts in the banking sector 
depend on the specific policy instrument chosen by the government and whether the 
positive effects outweigh the negative effects. Hence, the overall banking sector might 
be affected by government interventions in the form of bailouts, even with respect to the 
bailout of individual institutions. Gropp, Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) analyze the 
competitive effects of government bailouts, finding that government bailouts increase 
the risk-taking of competitor banks. Given the importance of the banking industry for 
the overall economy, such government interventions might also affect non-banking 
companies. For example, Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) find that Japanese non-financial 
firms are significantly affected by government bailouts in the banking sector. Given the 
interlinkages and similarities in business models between banks and insurers, such 
events also have the potential to affect insurance firms. 
The effect of banking frauds on banks: Literature on operational risk and 
fraud events is vast and growing in the banking sector, in particular given the 
extraordinary losses of rogue traders in recent years such as the losses caused by traders 
at Société Générale in 2008 (5 billion Euro) or at UBS in 2011 (1.5 billion Euro).
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These extreme events show that large losses due to fraud events can endanger the health 
of financial institutions. A vast number of papers use event study methodology to 
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 Given that new regulatory frameworks in the financial industry, such as Solvency II and Basel III, 
account for operational risk, knowledge on their impact on financial firms is particularly valuable from a 
regulatory perspective. In addition, recent trends in the financial sector, for example the growth of e-
commerce or automation, increase the firms’ focus on these types of risk. 
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analyze the effect of operational losses and fraud events on financial firms.
64
 Even 
though such fraud events are one-time losses that should not affect future revenue 
streams, they still affect financial firms significantly, as they also damage the firms’ 
reputation (Perry and de Fontnouvelle, 2005).
65
 Most studies find that the stock market 
drops of firms in the aftermath of banking fraud events exceed the monetary loss (Gillet, 
Hübner and Plunus, 2010; Cummins, Lewis and Wei, 2006) due to reputational losses. 
Given that such events convey negative news about affected financial firms, they might 
also spill over to non-affected firms from the financial sector, as these firms are active 
in the same business and therefore might be prone to such events in the future. 
Cummins, Wei and Xie (2011) analyze information externalities attributable to 
operational risk events from financial firms that announce operational losses.
66
 They 
find that the announcements of operational losses affect not only the announcing firms, 
but also unaffected institutions, i.e. severe fraud events can affect the overall industry 
negatively.  
 
4.2.3 Interconnectedness in the Financial Industry 
Previous literature provides evidence of strong systemic linkages between banks 
and insurers. As systemic risk arises from interconnectedness among financial 
institutions (Cummins and Weiss, 2014), findings regarding inter-sector 
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 See e.g. Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005); Cummins, Lewis and Wei (2006) Sturm (2013), Gillet, 
Hübner and Plunus (2010), Cummins, Lewis and Wei (2011) and Fiordelisi, Soana and Schwizer (2014). 
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 In addition, fraud events might have indirect effects on affected firms, such as the loss of current or 
future customers, employees or managers, increased costs of funding or costs due to fines and other 
penalties (Perry and de Fontnouvelle, 2005; Sturm, 2013). 
66
 Operational risk events cause investors to decrease estimates of expected future cash flows at similar 
firms in the financial sector, which leads to lower market values across the industry. This may be due to 
several reasons. Operational losses may indicate the potential for the occurrence of similar events 
affecting non-announcing firms in the future. In addition, they could indicate higher anticipated 
regulatory costs. Alternatively, the competition hypothesis (Lang and Stulz 1992) states that adverse 
events such as frauds weaken the affected financial firms and therefore lead to market value increases at 
its competitors, because customers shift their business away from the fraudulent banks (Cummins, Wei 
and Xie, 2011). 
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interconnectedness may provide valuable insights for regulators. Being interconnected 
is a necessary condition for the spreading of systemic risk events in the financial sector, 
as in the absence of interconnectedness, the failure, or severe problems of a single firm 
would leave the other institutions and the rest of the economy unaffected. Given the fact 
that severe banking events like the failure of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent 
financial crisis can severely impact firms from other sectors, it is an open question how 
banking-specific events in general affect the insurance sector. 
From a theoretical perspective, the transmission of shocks between formerly 
separated sectors in the financial industry has increased given closer business ties and 
increased competition between firms from these sectors (Billio et al., 2012). With the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999
67
 and through financial innovations, 
interrelationships between banks, insurers and funds increased, leading to a highly 
interconnected financial industry. Thus, their exposure to common shocks (e.g. 
changing market prices and economic conditions) converged (Billio et al., 2012). 
Hence, companies that provide similar products that serve similar economic needs can 
be expected to react similarly to informational events, regardless of their nominal 
industrial category (Cummins, Wei and Xie, 2011). Banks and insurers partly compete 
in certain services offered (Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons, 2011); hence, consumers 
might shift their business from firms that were negatively affected by those events to 
unaffected firms (competition hypothesis, Lang and Stulz, 1992).
68
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 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act removed barriers between banks and insurance companies in November 
1999. This essentially legalized the Citicorp–Travelers Group merger which occurred the previous year. 
Since then, commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, and insurers were allowed to 
consolidate. See Carow (2001) for further information. 
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 In addition, Kaufmann (1999, 2000) states that an externality or a shock might create uncertainty about 
other firms and thus indirectly cause institutional instabilities, even though these shocks do not directly 
affect the firms. Similarly, Halstead, Hedge and Klein (2005) examine two types of financial contagion 
with respect to the bailout of LTCM (Long Term Capital Management) in 1998: direct or indirect 
exposure and non-fundamental based contagion, i.e. by firms unexposed to LTCM: Severe events can 
cause an irrational market response and affect other firms despite only a little real connection or 
interdependence between the firms. In particular, major banking-related events might affect firms from 
other sectors even if they are not directly exposed to them. 
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Several papers address the issue of spillover effects and connectedness between 
insurers and banks. Billio et al. (2012) use monthly returns of banks, hedge funds, 
brokers/dealers and insurers and granger-causality networks to measure the degree of 
connectedness in the overall financial industry. They find a high degree of 
interconnectedness in the financial sector that has been growing in the last years. 
Moreover, they state that shocks transmitted by banks have stronger effects on the other 
sectors than shocks from other industries. Chen et al. (2014) develop a systemic risk 
measure and analyze the interconnectedness in the financial sector. They find that banks 
and insurers are strongly interconnected, while the impact of banks on insurers is much 
stronger than vice versa. 
Thus, the literature suggests that banks and insurers are interconnected and that 
they can influence each other’s performance. Furthermore, banks can affect insurers 
much stronger than vice versa. Moreover, Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011) show 
that insurance-related events such as natural catastrophes and terror attacks affect the 
stock prices of insurance firms, but the banking sector remains mostly unaffected. 
However, the previous literature has not examined the effect of individual, banking-
specific events on the insurance industry. Hence, we analyze the degree of 
interconnectedness in the financial sector with respect to banking-specific events. 
 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
We use daily stock price returns and financial statement data for all publicly 
traded insurance companies in the U.S. provided by SNL Financial. For our event study 
we drop firms if the stock prices are not available for the observed events or during the 
estimation period. Furthermore, for the regression analysis we drop firms with missing, 
negative or zero surplus or total assets and insurance companies with zero net premiums 
77 
 
written. In addition, the data is winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles to control for 
extreme outliers. Insurers are divided into property-casualty insurers and life insurers, 
given their different business models and thus potentially different reactions towards the 
events based on the classification provided by SNL Financial.
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4.3.2 Central Bank Announcements and Banking Events 
Building on Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci (2014) and 
Ricci (2015) we compile a dataset of major policy initiatives announced during the 
financial crisis (between June 2007 and March 2009). In contrast to these papers, we 
purely focus on U.S. policy announcements, given their importance for the global 
economy, our sole focus on U.S. firms and the limited impact of foreign policy 
initiatives found in previous research (e.g. Kim, Lee and Wu, 2013). The 
announcements are identified based on official press releases, newspapers and search 
engines and are double checked with the database of Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012).
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Consistent with their research, we include announcements from the following categories 
in our analysis: 
Conventional central bank announcements include the FED’s decisions to 
change interest rates or leave them unchanged. Following Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), 
Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci (2014) and Ricci (2015), increases and no changes are 
treated as a single category. 
Liquidity support includes measures to provide liquidity through extended access 
to central bank refinancing, collateral framework or more frequent auctions or longer 
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 According to the definition in SNL, a company can be classified as both property-casualty insurer and a 
life insurer. Given that we aim to analyze the overall sectors’ reaction we do not drop companies that are 
active in both sectors. In addition, all analyses are conducted separately for property-casualty insurers and 
life insurers, so a firm is never included twice in any of our regression. Furthermore, we include a dummy 
variable indicating if the firm is active in both property-casualty and life insurance in all our regression 
analyses. 
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 We thank the authors for making their database available to us. Our database is available upon request. 
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maturities (Domestic currency liquidity support). In addition, the provision of foreign 
currency liquidity through swap agreements (Foreign currency swaps) between central 
banks is included in this category. 
Financial sector policies include measures to resolve systemic banking crises. 
This category includes Asset purchases, that is, the use of public funds to buy risky 
assets to protect banks from the losses from such assets. In addition, ring-fencing of bad 
assets is included. In addition, Liability guarantees are included, which are system-wide 
guarantees for (existing or newly-issued) wholesale financing, the enhancement of 
deposit protection schemes and the lender-of-last resort funding. Moreover, 
Recapitalization includes the announcements of system-wide recapitalization funds and 
capital injections. Finally, Monetary policy includes Quantitative and credit easing 
(QE), that is, the central bank’s purchases of government securities and purchases of 
private sector debt in primary or secondary markets.  
Consistent with related studies, we need to deal with the issue of overlapping 
events. Given that, in contrast to related studies, we focus on policy announcements and 
firms from a single country only, the problem is somewhat mitigated, but some 
announcements still take place at the same day. In such cases, we follow Fiordelisi, 
Galloppo and Ricci (2014) and Ricci (2015) and treat announcements as a single event 
if they belong to the same category.
71
 Following Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), we include 
equally important policy announcements from different categories in the few cases they 
provide equally important information as separate entries in our database. To examine 
whether the impact of policy interventions is state dependent, that is, if it depends on 
changes in the economic environment over time, we subdivide our period into two sub-
periods: The period before the Lehman failure (Subprime Crisis; from June 2007 until 
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 For example, on July 30, 2008, the FED released three measures to provide liquidity. These are 
included as a single announcement in our analysis. 
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September 14, 2008), and the period after the failure of Lehman between September 14, 
2008 and March 31, 2009, which denotes the Global Financial Crisis. Table 12 reports 
the list of policy announcements examined in this study. 
Table 12 List of Policy Announcements 
Type Measures Example Number of announcements 
Conventional announcements 
    
 
Interest rate decisions 
  
18 
 
  
Interest rate cuts Decision to decrease 
interest rates. 
  
10 
    
Interest rate increases and no 
changes 
Interest rate increases 
and decisions to 
maintain interest 
rates unchanged.   
 
8 
Non-conventional announcements     
  
 
Liquidity support   33
72
 
 
  
Domestic currency liquidity 
support 
Relaxation of 
collateral framework; 
change in funding 
terms or auction 
schedule; support of 
money markets. 
U.S. Term 
Auction Facility 
(12/12/2007; 
12/21/2007). 
 
28 
  
Foreign currency swaps FX swaps and FX 
funding. 
FOMC increases 
swap lines with 
the ECB by 
$10bn and the 
SNB by $2bn 
(03/11/2008). 
 
5 
 
Financial sector policies   33 
 
  
Asset purchases Asset purchases; 
Ring-fencing of bad 
assets and asset 
guarantees. 
Troubled Asset 
Relief Program 
(10/03/08). 
 
7 
  
Liability guarantees Guarantees for old or 
new liabilities. 
U.S. Temporary 
Liquidty 
Guarantee 
Program 
/10/14/2008). 
 
9 
  
Recapitalization Capital injection and 
nationalization. 
TARP 
capitalization of 
nine U.S. banks. 
 
17 
 
Monetary policy   5 
 
 
Quantitative and credit 
easing 
 FED buys long-
term Treasuries 
(03/18/2009). 
 
5 
   
    
Total (conventional and non-
conventional)     89 89 
Note: This table reports all policy announcements used in our analysis. Type denotes the type of policy 
announcement. Measures describe the type of intervention. Example provides an example for the 
measure. Number of announcements denotes the amount of observations for each type of announcement. 
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 Two of these 33 measures were announced on March 16, 2008, three on July 30, 2008 and two on 
September 14, 2008. Consistent with Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), these were treated as three individual 
events. Therefore, the final amount of Liquidity announcements in our analyses amounts to 29. 
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For banking sector-specific events, we include major bailouts of individual 
financial institutions (Hryckiewicz, 2014; Grace, 2011) and major banking fraud events 
(Gillet, Hübner and Plunus, 2010) that have been found to affect banking companies in 
previous studies.
73
 We do not restrict our analysis to events that occurred in the U.S. 
and include important events from all over the world to examine how these major 
events have global systemic relevance in the financial industry.
74
 Table 13 reports the 
list of events examined in this study and provides further information on the events. 
Table 13 List of Banking Shocks 
Event Date Category Country Description 
Allied Irish Banks (AIB) 
Trader Scandal 
February 4, 2002 FRD USA AIB announces trading loss of $0.8 billion due to 
fraudulent trading. 
Société Générale Trading 
Loss Incident 
January 24, 2008 FRD F Announcement of a $7.2 billion loss due to 
fraudulent trades by Société Générale. 
Northern Rock Bailout February 22, 2008 BLT UK Bailout of Northern Rock. 
Bear Stearns Bailout March 17, 200875 BLT USA Bailout of Bear Stearns and merger with JP Morgan 
Chase. 
Fannie Mae Bailout September 7, 2008 BLT USA Bailout of Fannie Mae. 
RBS Bailout October 13, 2008 BLT UK Bailout of Royal Bank of Scotland. 
Citigroup Bailout November 23, 2008 BLT USA Bailout of Citigroup. 
UBS Trader Scandal September 15, 2011 FRD UK Announcement of a $2 billion loss due to fraudulent 
trades by UBS. 
JP Morgan Chase Trading 
Loss 
July 13, 2012 FRD USA Announcement of a $5.8 billion loss due to 
fraudulent trades by JPMorgan Chase. 
LIBOR Scandal July 27, 201276 FRD EU/USA Announcements of high fines against banks that 
manipulated the LIBOR. 
Note: This table reports all banking shocks used in our analysis. Event indicates the event’s name. Date 
indicates the date the event occurred. Category denotes the respective categories: BLT: Bailout events; 
FRD: Fraud events. Country denotes the country in which the event occurred. Description provides a 
brief description of the event. 
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 We include bailouts of banks and frauds in the banking sector only to focus on shocks originating from 
the banking sector. Thus, bailouts (such as the bailout of General Motors during the financial crisis) and 
frauds of non-financial firms are not included in our analysis. 
74
 A large amount of papers indicate the importance of international shocks on local financial firms (e.g. 
Bekaert et al., 2014). Gropp and Moermann (2004) show that idiosyncratic shocks of banks are 
transmitted to banks from other countries.  
75
 The bailout took place on March 16, 2008, a Sunday. Thus, Monday 17 represents the next trading day. 
76
 We use July 27, 2012 as event date, as this day presents the press cutting date, i.e. the date on which the 
scandal was made public to the media. This approach follows Gillet, Hübner and Plunus (2010) who 
analyze operational risk events using the press cutting date. For robustness, we repeat our event study 
using the dates on which fines were announced (December 4, 2013) instead of other dates to examine the 
LIBOR Scandal, as the scandal was made public through information leakages by newspapers long before 
the banks admitted the manipulation. Thus, the announcements of fines might be more unanticipated and 
therefore better capture the consequences of the LIBOR Scandal for the financial sector The results are 
consistent and do not depend on the date chosen. 
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4.3.3 Methodology 
We start our analysis using event study methodology. Event studies can be used 
to measure the effects of economic events on the value of the respective firm, usually 
measured by the firm’s common equity price.77 Thus, we estimate the firms’ normal 
returns based on the following model: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝐾𝑇+𝑒𝑖,𝑡  (5) 
 
Ri,t are the daily (t) stock market returns from each insurer (i). 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝐾𝑇are the daily 
stock market returns from the broad stock market index (proxied by the S&P 500). We 
use a period from 280 to 30 days (250 days) prior to the event (estimation window) to 
calculate the individual stock’s beta based on equation (5). Then, the abnormal returns 
are calculated during the event window ([-τ, +τ], with -τ as the amount of days before 
the event and +τ as the amount of days after the event).78 Compared to other event 
studies that focus on single events or events from the same category in their analysis, 
our analysis includes different types of events that comprise different characteristics 
regarding their effects on firms. Hence, we use different event windows to take into 
consideration the heterogeneity of our events. For each event category, we use six event 
windows for our analysis that capture the events’ effects on the firms to ensure the 
robustness of our results to the use of alternative time windows.  
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 Measuring the stock price reaction to examine the effect of such events has several advantages, as 
equity prices summarize all publicly available information, including firm risk and expectations on future 
performance, in one single number (Castrén et al., 2006). In addition, previous studies show that banks’ 
stock price reactions to monetary announcements are a barometer for their effectiveness (Yin, Yang and 
Handorf, 2010). Finally, stock price information are available at a higher frequency than accounting 
measures (Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci, 2014). 
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 Common methods for event studies might provide biased results in case an event has different effects 
on firms and if the returns’ variances increase (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991). Severe events 
can change the risk and returns of stocks, as indicated by increases in the returns’ variances (Brown, 
Harlow and Tinic, 1988; 1989). Such increases in variance might be cause by temporary changes in the 
firms’ betas. We therefore control for the potential event-induced variance increases around event days by 
using a variance-adjusted Z-statistic proposed by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) which is 
robust against these event-induced changes of variances and incorporates information from both the 
estimation period and the event period. Robust standard errors are used when we perform the regressions 
and tests. 
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For policy announcements, we follow previous studies
79
 and use event windows 
of [0; +1], [-1; +1] and [0; 0] in our analysis. For robustness, we include event windows 
of [-2; +1], [-2; +2] and [-1; +2]. For bailouts, we use event windows of [-8; +8] and [-
16; +16]. In addition, we include windows that capture effects in case of prior 
information leakages ([-8; +2]) due to long pre-event periods and short-term windows 
([0; +2]; [-2; +2]; [-1; +1]) to analyze if the effects close to the bailout’s official 
announcement date. For frauds, we focus on short-term windows, as these events should 
be unknown for the wide public and therefore be unanticipated by investors.
80
 Hence, 
we include event windows of [-5; +5]; [-8; +2]; [-1; +1]; [0; +4]; [-4; +2] and [-2; +2] in 
our analysis (Cummins, Lewis, and Wei, 2006). For each event, the abnormal return for 
each stock i is calculated (i.e. the difference between the predicted and the actual return 
during the event window) in each window separately. Finally, we calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as the sum of the abnormal returns over the event 
window for each firm. 
 
4.3.4 Regression Analyses to analyze Firm-Level Determinants 
Moreover, we conduct regression analyses in order to identify the individual 
firms’ determinants of their stock market response. This provides evidence on the types 
of firms and the business models that are more sensitive to policy announcements and 
idiosyncratic shocks from other sectors.
81
 This approach is consistent with that used 
elsewhere (e.g. Ricci, 2015; Cummins, Lewis and Wei, 2006). Following this approach 
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 Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci (2014) and Ricci (2015). 
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 In addition, their monetary impact should be relatively clear, thus event windows that consider long 
periods after the announcements should not add further information on the impact (Cummins, Wei and 
Xie, 2006). For robustness, we include an event window that considers a long period prior to the event in 
order to control for prior information leakage ([-16; +16]) and the fraud events’ long-run effects. Our 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
81
 Altunbas, Manganelli and Marques-Ibanez (2011) show that the business models of financial 
institutions’ strongly affected their risk exposure during the recent financial crisis. Therefore, we expect 
that the firms’ business models also affect their exposure towards shocks from other sectors. 
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we use the firm’s market value response (CAR) for each event window separately as the 
dependent variable. We conduct those analyses separately for each type of event, i.e. we 
have separate regression analyses for conventional announcements, non-conventional 
announcements and banking shocks. Hence, we start by estimating the following 
model:
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗 =  𝛼 +  𝛿
′𝑋𝑖,𝑙,𝑗 + 𝜃
′𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛾𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗 (6) 
 
where CARi,j is the individual firm i’s CAR and 𝑋𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 is a vector of 𝑙 firm-specific 
variables that are expected to affect the firms’ stock responses based on previous 
research. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 is a vector of k control variables. Crisis is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the event takes place during the Global Financial Crisis (between September 
14, 2008 and March 31, 2009). 𝑗 denotes the respective event. δ, θ, and γ are the 
coefficients to be estimated. The firm-specific variables 𝑋𝑖,𝑙,𝑗 contain factors that 
affected the firms’ reaction to sector-specific events in pervious papers or other 
characteristics of their business models that are likely to affect their capital market 
response. We include a measure of the insurers’ default risk, given that firms that are 
perceived as more risky by investors are expected to be more sensitive to policy 
interventions (Yin and Yang, 2013). The same holds for banking sector shocks. We 
include the firms’ Z-Score to measure the insurers’ riskiness.83 Similarly, we expect that 
insurers with a better capitalization are less exposed to monetary policy interventions 
and banking shocks. Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) show that banks with lower 
leverage are less sensitive to monetary policy changes as they are perceived less risky 
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 As we pool the data from different years, we use clustered standard and include firm fixed effects. 
Moreover, we test for multicollinearity among the independent variables using variance inflation factors 
(VIFs). In all models, the mean VIF is well below the benchmark of 10, indicating that multicollinearity 
appears to be no concern in our analysis (Belsley et al., 2005; Chatterjee et al., 2013). 
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 The Z-Score is defined as the financial firm’s return on asset plus its capital ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of its return on assets for the previous 5 years. 
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by investors and their interest margins are less sensitive to interest rates. Regarding 
banking shocks, higher capitalized firms have been shown to better withstand market 
shocks (Ricci, 2015). We include the ratio of equity to total assets to measure the 
insurers’ Leverage. We include the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (Size) to 
control for company size. In general, larger firms can be expected to be less affected by 
shocks and policy interventions as such firms are usually to be better collateralized and 
more immune from binding credit constrains (Guo, 2004). However, Brewer III et al. 
(2007) find that larger life insurers are more sensitive to interest rates and can therefore 
be expected to be more affected by monetary policy announcements. In addition, we 
include 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑗, a vector of control variables. We include Asset Risk (Stocks and 
bonds divided by surplus) to control for the firms’ asset exposure, Market Share (based 
on premium income) to control for its market power and Cost Efficiency (The insurer's 
expense ratio for life insurers and the insurer's combined ratio for PC insurers) to 
control for the firms’ cost efficiency. In addition, we include Premium growth, defined 
as the change in net premiums compared to the previous year. High premium growth 
can result in higher default risk in times of crises (Chen and Wong, 2004) and therefore 
affect the firm’s response to banking shocks and monetary interventions during the 
recent financial crisis. Finally, we include Multi, a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm is active in both life and property-casualty business. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 14 shows the summary statistics of firm level variables used in our 
regression analysis. Note that while we include events from different years, we only 
include summary statistics for the years that match the events in our analysis (2002, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012). It can be seen that the insurance firms can be 
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considered as relatively safe, given their levels of Z-Score. Furthermore, PC insurers 
show higher levels of capitalization compared to life insurers. 
Table 14 Summary Statistics 
      PC     Life   
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Size The natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets  375 15.03 1.59 217 16.30 2.14 
Leverage The ratio of equity to total assets 375 0.32 0.10 217 0.12 0.10 
Z-Score The  firm’s return on asset plus its capital ratio divided by 
the standard deviation of its return on assets for the the 
previous 5 years. 
375 22.72 22.96 217 17.32 16.03 
Asset Risk Stocks and bonds divided by surplus. 375 0.25 0.26 217 0.37 0.37 
Cost Efficiency The insurer's expense ratio for life insurers; The insurer's 
combined ratio for PC insurers. 
375 1.06 0.33 217 0.14 0.09 
Market Share The insurer's market share. 375 0.02 0.03 217 0.03 0.04 
Growth The change in net premiums compared to the previous year 375 0.07 0.25 217 0.05 0.27 
Multi A dummy variable equal to one if the firm is active in both 
life and property-liability business.  
375 0.21 0.41 217 0.37 0.48 
Crisis A dummy variable equal to one if the event takes place 
between September 14, 2009 and March 31, 2009.  
375 0.62 0.49 217 0.61 0.49 
Note: This table reports summary statistics and definitions for the firm level variables used in our 
regression analysis. It includes observations from the years 2002, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012 that 
match the events (banking shocks and policy announcements) in our analysis. PC denotes property-
casualty insurers. Life denotes life insurers. 
 
4.4.2 Event Study Results 
Table 15 presents the results of our event study for non-conventional policy 
announcement during the crisis between 2007 and 2009.
84
 For each different type of 
announcement, we present the results of pooled event studies for property-casualty 
insurers (PC), life insurers (Life) and all insurers (All) separately. Panel A presents the 
results for the Subprime Crisis, while Panel B presents the results for the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
Our results indicate that Financial sector policies had a positive effect on the 
stock prices of insurance firms during the financial crisis. Indeed, our results are 
consistent with Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), as they indicate mostly positive stock market 
responses in the aftermath of the announcements of Asset purchases, Liability 
guarantees and Recapitalizations during the Global Financial Crisis. This shows that 
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 Note that, while some firms focus on only one sector, a company can be classified as both property-
casualty insurer and a life insurer in SNL. Therefore, the sum of insurance firms in our sample in Table 
15 - Table 17 (All) differs from the sum of property-casualty insurers (PC) and a life insurers (Life), given 
that several firms are included in our subsample of property-casualty insurers and life insurers. 
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measures that primarily aim to stabilize the banking sector and financial markets also 
have a stabilizing effect on insurance firms. Hence, policymakers can efficiently use 
such measures as they directly transfer risks from banks’ balance sheets to sovereigns. 
This also benefits firms from other sectors such as insurance firms.
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For Liquidity support,
86
 our results indicate that such measures have a positive 
impact on the insurance sector in the Global Financial Crisis. This is consistent with 
Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci (2014), Ricci (2015) and Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), who 
find positive stock market responses of banks and aggregate stock markets and 
decreases in risk premia for these announcements. Consistent with these papers, the 
impact of Liquidity support is strongly state dependent, as the stock prize reactions are 
less significant in most event windows during the Subprime Crisis. Thus, providing 
liquidity in times of crisis indicates to be an efficient mechanism for policymakers to 
support not only banks and aggregate markets, but also insurance firms. 
Regarding Quantitative and credit easing, our results indicate that such 
measures had ambiguous effects on the stock prices of insurance firms. This is 
consistent with the findings of Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci (2014) and Aït-Sahalia et 
al. (2012) regarding aggregate stock markets and decreases in risk premia. Thus, such 
measures were hardly able to counteract the effects of the financial crisis and to restore 
stability in the insurance sector. Given that the introduction of Quantitative and credit 
easing has been widely debated and criticized in the public prior to its implementation 
due to its undetermined consequences, our results provide valuable implications from a 
policymaker’s perspective. 
                                                          
85
 The impact of Liability guarantees during the Subprime Crisis is rather negative, indicating that such 
measures are state dependent as they depend on the economic conditions. However, our dataset includes 
only a single announcement of Liability guarantees during the Subprime Crisis. 
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 Following Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci (2014) and Ricci (2015), we combine Domestic currency 
liquidity support and Foreign currency swaps in a single category (Liquidity support). 
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Table 15 Event Study Results – Non-Conventional Announcements 
Panel A: Subprime Crisis 
 
Panel B: Global Financial Crisis 
 
Financial sector policies - Asset purchases 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-2/+1 NA NA NA 
 
-2/+1 0.713
***
 0.627
**
 0.542
***
 
-2/+2 NA NA NA 
 
-2/+2 0.241 -0.028 0.069 
-1/+1 NA NA NA 
 
-1/+1 0.430
**
 0.799
***
 0.428
***
 
-0/+1 NA NA NA 
 
-0/+1 0.130 0.412 0.165 
-0/+0 NA NA NA 
 
-0/+0 0.013 0.128 0.029 
-1/+2 NA NA NA 
 
-1/+2 -0.042 0.144 -0.045 
N 0 0 0 
 
N 453 259 610 
Financial sector policies - Liability guarantees 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-2/+1 -2.755
***
 -2.333
***
 -2.322
***
 
 
-2/+1 0.996
***
 0.458 0.845
***
 
-2/+2 -1.013
**
 -1.302
**
 -0.884
**
 
 
-2/+2 1.330
***
 0.734 1.267
***
 
-1/+1 -1.883
***
 -1.596
***
 -1.559
***
 
 
-1/+1 0.632
**
 0.071 0.384 
-0/+1 -1.506
***
 -1.357
***
 -1.291
***
 
 
-0/+1 -0.443
*
 -1.295
***
 -0.719
***
 
-0/+0 -0.924
***
 -0.536
***
 -0.750
***
 
 
-0/+0 0.148 0.098 0.113 
-1/+2 -0.14 -0.565 -0.121 
 
-1/+2 0.966
***
 0.346 0.806
***
 
N 63 37 85 
 
N 445 259 600 
Financial sector policies - Recapitalization 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-2/+1 NA NA NA 
 
-2/+1 0.371
***
 0.039 0.195
*
 
-2/+2 NA NA NA 
 
-2/+2 0.233
**
 -0.196 0.043 
-1/+1 NA NA NA 
 
-1/+1 0.458
***
 0.317
*
 0.310
***
 
-0/+1 NA NA NA 
 
-0/+1 0.275
***
 0.167 0.183
***
 
-0/+0 NA NA NA 
 
-0/+0 0.082 0.108 0.051 
-1/+2 NA NA NA 
 
-1/+2 0.321
***
 0.081 0.158
*
 
N 0 0 0 
 
N 1052 592 1415 
Liquidity support -   Domestic currency liquidity support and Foreign currency swaps 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-2/+1 0.092 0.199
*
 0.093 
 
-2/+1 0.997
***
 0.670
**
 0.889
***
 
-2/+2 0.111 0.268
**
 0.144
*
 
 
-2/+2 0.148 -0.581 -0.011 
-1/+1 -0.012 0.058 -0.026 
 
-1/+1 1.018
***
 0.974
***
 0.974
***
 
-0/+1 -0.148
**
 0.002 -0.122
*
 
 
-0/+1 0.868
***
 0.843
***
 0.842
***
 
-0/+0 -0.015 -0.023 -0.049 
 
-0/+0 0.330
**
 0.489
**
 0.366
***
 
-1/+2 0.007 0.127 0.025 
 
-1/+2 0.169 -0.277 0.075 
N 1305 777 1767 
 
N 449 259 605 
Monetary policy - Quantitative and credit easing 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-2/+1 NA NA NA 
 
-2/+1 0.252 0.470 0.304 
-2/+2 NA NA NA 
 
-2/+2 -0.324 -0.923
*
 -0.528
*
 
-1/+1 NA NA NA 
 
-1/+1 0.159 0.207 0.250 
-0/+1 NA NA NA 
 
-0/+1 0.057 -0.137 0.153 
-0/+0 NA NA NA 
 
-0/+0 0.482
***
 0.865
***
 0.657
***
 
-1/+2 NA NA NA 
 
-1/+2 -0.417 -1.186
**
 -0.582
**
 
N 0 0 0 
 
N 320 184 431 
Note: This table shows the pooled standardized CAR (cumulated abnormal return) and its level of 
significance (adjusted as in Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991) for the respective sector of the 
insurance industry at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance level for each category of 
announcements. Event Wind. denotes the event windows on that we base our analyses. N denotes the 
amount of observations for each firm type for the respective event. PC denotes property-casualty insurers. 
Life denotes life insurers.  
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Overall, our findings for non-conventional measures indicate that such measures 
are in general able to affect firms from the insurance sector. This is consistent with the 
findings of related papers for other sectors and aggregate markets. Mostly, the impacts 
of these announcements are positive, which justifies the resources devoted to such 
measures and help to attain the primary goal of insurance regulation, which is to protect 
policyholders (Klein, 1995). However, there was no silver bullet to contain the 
consequences of the crisis, as some measures were ineffective or affected insurance 
firms negatively.
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Table 16 presents the results of our event study for conventional policy 
announcements during the crisis between June 1, 2007 and March 31, 2009.
88
 Again, 
the results of pooled event studies are reported for property-casualty insurers (PC), life 
insurers (Life) and all insurers (All), separately, for the Subprime Crisis (Panel A) and 
for the Global Financial Crisis (Panel B). Regarding Interest rate increases and no 
changes, our findings indicate that property-casualty insurers remain unaffected during 
the Subprime Crisis, which is consistent with the findings in Ricci (2015) and Aït-
Sahalia et al. (2012) who find negligible effects of these measures prior to the Lehman 
failure. This indicates that the content of these announcements have been mostly 
correctly anticipated (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; León and Sebestyén, 2012). For life 
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 For robustness, we conduct our analyses with respect to non-conventional announcements that 
particularly focused on insurance firms or the insurance sector. Our dataset includes 5 of such 
announcements: The announcement of Lincoln National, Hartford Financial Services Group, and 
Genworth Financial to purchase lenders/depositories and thus qualify as savings and loan companies to 
access TARP funding and 4 events regarding capital injections and credit extensions for AIG. Our event 
study results indicate that these events had negative effects on the stock prices of insurance firms. Hence, 
from an investor’s perspective, such announcements increase concerns about the stability of the insurance 
sector, given the firms’ need for funds during the crisis. The results are available upon request. 
88
 While non-conventional announcements are only available between 2007 until 2009, we conduct a 
robustness check including conventional announcements prior to the crisis to provide a more 
comprehensive picture on their impact on insurance firms in non-crisis times. Hence, we examine the 
impact of conventional announcements between 2002 and July 2007 (Pre-Crisis Period) to analyze how 
these announcements affect insurers’ stock prices in more tranquil times. The results are consistent with 
the findings during the Subprime Crisis, that is, conventional announcements do mostly not affect the 
stock prices of insurers. Only some event windows indicate significant effects during this period. The 
results are available upon request. 
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insurers, we find negative stock market responses, which is consistent with theory 
(Brewer III et al., 2007) and the findings for the banking sector in previous research, 
who find an inverse relation between central bank interest decisions and banks’ stock 
prices (e.g. Madura and Schnusenberg, 2000). However, we do not find positive stock 
price responses for insurers for Interest rate cuts prior to the crisis.
89
 
However, during the Global Financial Crisis, our results change as Interest rate 
increases and no changes lead to positive stock price responses, while Interest rate cuts 
affect insurers mostly negative. This is consistent with the findings for banks in Ricci 
(2015) during this period. Apparently, the stock market rather appreciates the efforts of 
central banks to improve the economic environment by lowering interest rates instead of 
emphasizing the impact on the interest rate business models of insurance firms. 
Moreover, our results confirm the results of previous papers that show that non-
conventional policy measures are at least as important as conventional policy 
instruments, given that both types of measures can affect financial markets and the 
insurance sector in particular.  
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 Note that these results do not contradict the findings of Brewer III et al. (2007) who find that interest 
rate changes affect life insurers’ stock prices. Our results only indicate that the announcements of central 
banks regarding interest rate changes do not affect insurance firms, while changes in interest rates still 
affect insurance firms. One explanation might be that the announcements have been mostly correctly 
anticipated by investors and should therefore not affect stock prices. 
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Table 16 Event Study Results – Conventional Announcements  
Panel A: Subprime Crisis 
 
Panel B: Global Financial Crisis 
Conventional Measures: Interest rate increases and no changes 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-2/+1 -0.033 -0.533
*
 -0.183 
 
-2/+1 0.430 -0.110 0.318 
-2/+2 -0.326 -0.797
**
 -0.406
*
 
 
-2/+2 0.735
**
 0.153 0.599
**
 
-1/+1 0.300 -0.042 0.202 
 
-1/+1 0.734
***
 0.252 0.652
***
 
-0/+1 0.056 -0.408
*
 -0.126 
 
-0/+1 0.408
**
 -0.036 0.301
**
 
-0/+0 0.006 0.007 0.000 
 
-0/+0 0.807
***
 0.600
***
 0.758
***
 
-1/+2 0.006 -0.306 -0.021 
 
-1/+2 1.039
***
 0.514 0.932
***
 
N 248 148 336 
 
N 264 148 355 
 
Conventional Measures: Interest rate cuts 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-2/+1 -0.203 -0.039 -0.157 
 
-2/+1 -2.386
***
 -4.641
***
 -2.831
***
 
-2/+2 -0.357
*
 -0.038 -0.250 
 
-2/+2 -0.909
*
 -2.557
***
 -1.071
**
 
-1/+1 -0.037 -0.059 -0.055 
 
-1/+1 -2.176
***
 -3.691
***
 -2.402
***
 
-0/+1 -0.026 0.009 0.004 
 
-0/+1 -1.343
***
 -3.269
***
 -1.772
***
 
-0/+0 0.017 -0.037 -0.012 
 
-0/+0 -0.242 -0.969
**
 -0.384
*
 
-1/+2 -0.192 -0.059 -0.147 
 
-1/+2 -0.699 -1.607
*
 -0.642 
N 435 259 589 
 
N 189 111 255 
Note: This table shows the pooled standardized CAR (cumulated abnormal return) and its level of 
significance (adjusted as in Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991) for the respective sector of the 
insurance industry at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance level for each category of 
announcements. Event Wind. denotes the event windows on that we base our analyses. N denotes the 
amount of observations for each firm type for the respective event. PC denotes property-casualty insurers. 
Life denotes life insurers.  
Table 17 presents the results of individual event studies for banking bailouts 
(Panel A) and banking frauds (Panel B). Regarding bailouts, our results indicate that all 
events significantly affect firms from the insurance sector. The stock price reactions are 
strongly significant in most event windows, indicating that the insurance sector is highly 
exposed to shocks originating from the banking sector. Hence, while insurance-related 
events such as natural catastrophes and terror attacks affect the stock prices of insurance 
firms, but banks remain mostly unaffected (Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman, 2011), 
shocks from the banking sector do have an effect on insurers. In addition, our results are 
consistent with Miyajima and Yafeh (2007), who find that Japanese non-financial firms 
are significantly affected by bailouts in the banking sector. The direction of the effect, 
however, is not homogeneous: While the Northern Rock Bailout and the Bear Stearns 
Bailout have a negative effect on insurance firms, the Royal Bank of Scotland Bailout, 
the Fannie Mae Bailout and the Citigroup Bailout positively affect their stock prices. 
Hence, consistent with the theory (Cordella and Yehati, 2003; Keeley; 1990; 
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Hryckiewicz, 2014), the consequences of bailouts in the banking sector depend on the 
specific policy instrument chosen by the government and weather the positive effects 
outweighs the negative effects. Moreover, the results appear to be highly state-
dependent: While the results are negative prior to the Lehman failure (the Northern 
Rock Bailout and the Bear Stearns Bailout), they are positive for bailouts that occurred 
close to or after the Lehman failure (the Royal Bank of Scotland Bailout, the Fannie 
Mae Bailout and the Citigroup Bailout), which represents the peak of the turmoil in 
financial markets. Hence, from an investor’s perspective, the negative consequences of 
bailouts such as increases in moral hazard are strongly present in tranquil market 
environments, but are overweighed by the calming effects and signaling of regulatory 
strength during peak crisis times.
90
 Similarly, the results for fraud events (Panel B) are 
strongly state dependent in our analysis. While fraud events prior to the crisis (the Allied 
Irish Banks (AIB) Trader Scandal and the Société Générale Trading Loss Incident) do 
barely affect insurance firms, they have an economically and statistically strong, 
negative impact after the crisis (the UBS Trader Scandal, the JP Morgan Chase Trading 
Loss and the LIBOR Scandal). This indicates that the market did not recognize the threat 
of banking shocks as severe enough to significantly endanger firms from the insurance 
sector. However, the outbreak of the financial crisis showed the exposure of firms from 
other sectors towards shocks from the banking sector. Hence, investors are more 
sensitive to shocks from the banking sector in the aftermath of the crisis, given their 
potential to significantly threat firms from other sectors. 
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 This finding is supported by the results of event studies for related, non-banking bailouts that have been 
conducted for robustness. In particular, we follow Grace (2011) and Bhanot et al. (2014) and analyze the 
impacts of the bailout of the insurance firm AIG and the bailout of Greece in May 2010 on insurance 
firms. Both events took place after the Lehman failure and during peaks of a major crisis (the global 
financial crisis in the case of AIG and the Euro crisis in the case of the Greece bailout). Consistent with 
the bailouts of banks in this study, our results indicate positive effects of these non-banking bailouts on 
insurance firms and hence a stabilizing effect. The results are available upon request. 
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Table 17 Event Study Results – Banking Events 
Panel A: Bailouts 
 
Panel B: Frauds 
Northern Rock Bailout 
 
Allied Irish Banks (AIB) Trader Scandal 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-8/+8 -3.239
***
 -2.727
***
 -3.047
***
 
 
-5/+5 0.271 -0.184 0.159 
-16/+16 -3.196
***
 -6.296
***
 -4.234
***
 
 
-8/+2 0.476 -0.878
*
 0.392 
-0/+2 0.151 0.01 0.045 
 
-2/+2 0.158 0.111 0.208 
-2/+2 -0.026 0.438 0.082 
 
-1/+1 -0.211 -0.13 -0.166 
-1/+1 -0.257 0.114 -0.147 
 
-4/+2 0.085 -0.064 0.123 
-8/+2 -1.805
***
 -0.573 -1.357
***
 
 
-0/+4 0.229 0.382 0.217 
N 63 37 85 
 
N 48 28 64 
Bear Stearns Bailout 
 
Société Générale Trading Loss Incident 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-8/+8 -1.000
**
 -1.178 -1.363
**
 
 
-5/+5 1.042
*
 -0.193 0.782 
-16/+16 -1.658
***
 -1.574 -2.078
***
 
 
-8/+2 0.702 0.957 0.67 
-0/+2 -0.786
**
 -0.695 -0.928
***
 
 
-2/+2 -0.247 -0.943
*
 -0.445 
-2/+2 -1.585
***
 -0.598 -1.366
***
 
 
-1/+1 -0.015 -0.638 -0.194 
-1/+1 -0.703
**
 -0.545 -0.607
**
 
 
-4/+2 -0.355 -0.444 -0.32 
-8/+2 -1.295
***
 -2.501
*
 -2.069
***
 
 
-0/+4 0.052 0.154 0.151 
N 63 37 85 
 
N 63 37 85 
Fannie Mae Bailout 
 
UBS Trader Scandal 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-8/+8 5.462
***
 2.783 5.126
***
 
 
-5/+5 -1.422
***
 -1.541
***
 -1.551
***
 
-16/+16 6.916
***
 3.214
*
 5.826
***
 
 
-8/+2 -1.449
***
 -1.316
***
 -1.402
***
 
-0/+2 0.558
*
 0.571 0.700
***
 
 
-2/+2 -1.642
***
 -1.343
***
 -1.621
***
 
-2/+2 1.147
***
 1.067
***
 1.176
***
 
 
-1/+1 -0.653
***
 -0.513 -0.725
***
 
-1/+1 0.724
**
 0.793
***
 0.745
***
 
 
-4/+2 -1.421
***
 -0.637 -1.258
***
 
-8/+2 3.668
***
 3.773
***
 3.650
***
 
 
-0/+4 -2.146
***
 -2.473
***
 -2.340
***
 
N 63 37 85 
 
N 68 38 93 
Royal Bank of Scotland Bailout  
 
JPMorgan Chase Trading loss 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-8/+8 0.384 -3.437
*
 -0.689 
 
-5/+5 -1.651
***
 -0.877
*
 -1.373
***
 
-16/+16 1.454 -1.904 0.106 
 
-8/+2 -0.342 -0.138 -0.235 
-0/+2 4.135
***
 6.788
***
 4.168
***
 
 
-2/+2 -0.860
***
 -0.560
*
 -0.774
***
 
-2/+2 4.009
***
 5.742
***
 4.051
***
 
 
-1/+1 -0.506
***
 -0.359
**
 -0.457
***
 
-1/+1 5.741
***
 10.271
***
 6.847
***
 
 
-4/+2 -0.686
***
 0.155 -0.373 
-8/+2 0.608 0.772 0.523 
 
-0/+4 -1.811
***
 -1.870
***
 -1.859
***
 
N 63 37 85 
 
N 69 40 95 
Citigroup Bailout 
 
LIBOR Scandal 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
 
Event Wind. PC Life All 
-8/+8 3.114
***
 1.910 2.409
***
 
 
-5/+5 -1.863
***
 -0.964
*
 -1.780
***
 
-16/+16 5.560
***
 7.932
***
 6.056
***
 
 
-8/+2 -2.764
***
 -2.979
***
 -3.077
***
 
-0/+2 2.507
***
 4.422
***
 3.011
***
 
 
-2/+2 -1.097
***
 -1.370
***
 -1.369
***
 
-2/+2 2.379
***
 3.521
***
 2.541
***
 
 
-1/+1 -1.204
***
 -0.909
***
 -1.171
***
 
-1/+1 2.179
***
 4.766
***
 2.846
***
 
 
-4/+2 -1.200
***
 -1.160
**
 -1.380
***
 
-8/+2 1.541
***
 -0.764 0.736 
 
-0/+4 -0.609
*
 0.023 -0.443 
N 63 37 85 
 
N 69 40 95 
Note: This table shows the standardized CAR (cumulated abnormal return) and its level of significance 
(adjusted as in Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991) for the respective sector of the financial industry 
at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance level for each event separately. Event Wind. denotes 
the event windows on that we base our analyses. N denotes the amount of observations for each firm type 
for the respective event. PC denotes property-casualty insurers. Life denotes life insurers. Panel A denotes 
the results for Bailouts and Panel B the results for Frauds. 
 
 
Concluding, our results indicate a strong degree of interconnectedness in the 
financial sector, as shocks from the banking sector can not only affect banks, but can 
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also spillover to insurance firms. Hence, such assets are not suitable to diversify bank-
specific risk. Our findings indicate that insurance firms are prone to banking-related 
events, while previous papers (e.g. Billio et al., 2012; Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman; 
2011) indicate a low potential for insurance firms and insurance-related events to threat 
firms from the banking sector. 
 
4.4.3 Regression Analysis Results 
Finally, Table 18- 23 present the results of regression analyses to identify firm-
specific determinants of the firms’ stock price responses for property-casualty and life 
insurers separately.
91
 Our results indicate that in particular property-casualty insurers 
with low levels of capitalization (indicated by Leverage) and risky asset portfolios 
(Asset Risk) were positively affected by non-conventional announcements (Table 18 and 
Table 19). Hence, such announcements were perceived as particularly helpful for 
insurers with risky business models from an investor’s perspective. In addition, the 
coefficient of Crisis is positive and significant in most regressions, indicating a higher 
effect of policy announcements in times of crises. This provides additional evidence on 
the state dependency of such announcements. 
For conventional announcements (Table 20 and Table 21), we find that property-
casualty insurance firms with lower default risk (Z-Score)
92
 are less affected by 
conventional announcements. This is consistent with the findings for banks (e.g. Ricci, 
2015; Yin and Yang, 2013). Moreover, life insurers’ asset portfolios (Asset Risk) 
affected their stock price response. Again, this shows that investors consider the 
riskiness of the firms’ when evaluating the effect of policy interventions. In addition, 
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 For robustness, we conduct additional regression analyses using different sets of variables to proxy for 
the firm level characteristics in our regression. These include, among others, the risk-adjusted return on 
equity to measure the insurer’s riskiness and different measures of efficiency. The results remain 
consistent and are available upon request. 
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 The Z-Score is an inverse measure of default risk, that is, a higher Z-Score indicates less default risk. 
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larger life insurers are more sensitive to interest rate announcements (consistent with 
Brewer III et al., 2007).  
Table 18 Regression Results – Non-Conventional Announcements (PC Insurers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Event Window (-2/+1) (-2/+2) (-1/+1) (0/+1) (0/0) (-1/+2) 
Size -0.048 -0.039 -0.019 0.006 -0.002 -0.031 
 (0.047) (0.056) (0.032) (0.021) (0.018) (0.046) 
Leverage -0.186** -0.191** -0.135** -0.072 -0.028 -0.142* 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.055) (0.045) (0.032) (0.081) 
Z-Score 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk 0.060** 0.049** 0.038** 0.035** 0.020* 0.048** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.022) 
Cost Efficiency 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.022*** 0.017** 0.002 0.038*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.011) 
Market Share -0.786*** -0.496** -0.786*** -0.379** -0.143 -0.609*** 
 (0.210) (0.203) (0.275) (0.169) (0.122) (0.212) 
Growth -0.017 -0.019 -0.010 -0.010 -0.001 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.018) 
Multi 0.086*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.052*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Crisis 0.007** 0.004 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.006* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.752 0.632 0.303 -0.128 0.005 0.478 
 (0.777) (0.924) (0.531) (0.354) (0.296) (0.762) 
R2 0.043 0.036 0.030 0.030 0.020 0.034 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,771 4,771 4,771 4,771 4,771 4,771 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of fixed effects regression analyses using the CARs of 
different event windows as dependent variable. The variables are defined in Table 14. Stars denote 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Columns (1)-(6) denote different event windows.  
Table 19 Regression Results – Non-Conventional Announcements (Life Insurers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Event Window (-2/+1) (-2/+2) (-1/+1) (0/+1) (0/0) (-1/+2) 
Size 0.019 0.033 0.019 0.019 0.007 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.011) (0.008) (0.018) 
Leverage 0.002 -0.033 -0.051 -0.046 -0.051 0.019 
 (0.144) (0.136) (0.102) (0.067) (0.068) (0.126) 
Z-Score -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk 0.047** 0.027 0.022 0.014 0.011 0.029* 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.020) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) 
Cost Efficiency -0.133 -0.267** -0.166** 0.030 -0.086 -0.092 
 (0.163) (0.116) (0.079) (0.075) (0.059) (0.114) 
Market Share -1.281*** -1.046*** -1.109*** -0.613*** -0.366*** -1.094*** 
 (0.272) (0.338) (0.267) (0.136) (0.086) (0.238) 
Growth 0.001 -0.011 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) 
Multi 0.064 0.116* 0.063 0.034 0.036 0.057 
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.054) (0.031) (0.024) (0.053) 
Crisis -0.003 0.002 0.016*** 0.006** 0.009*** 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Constant -0.288 -0.494 -0.269 -0.325 -0.110 -0.375 
 (0.385) (0.352) (0.360) (0.201) (0.138) (0.306) 
R2 0.042 0.031 0.038 0.025 0.023 0.031 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,744 2,744 2,744 2,744 2,744 2,744 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of fixed effects regression analyses using the CARs of 
different event windows as dependent variable. The variables are defined in Table 14. Stars denote 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Columns (1)-(6) denote different event windows. 
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Table 20 Regression Results – Conventional Announcements (PC Insurers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Event Window (-2/+1) (-2/+2) (-1/+1) (0/+1) (0/0) (-1/+2) 
Size -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.005* -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage -0.019 -0.034 -0.005 0.022 -0.013 -0.020 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.030) (0.015) (0.016) (0.030) 
Z-Score -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Cost Efficiency 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.006** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Market Share -0.404 -0.162 -0.465* -0.359* -0.064 -0.300 
 (0.292) (0.143) (0.266) (0.211) (0.075) (0.221) 
Growth 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) 
Multi -0.016*** -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.039*** -0.029*** -0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Crisis 0.004* 0.007*** 0.000 -0.000 0.002** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 0.075 0.106 0.031 -0.045 0.095 0.047 
 (0.085) (0.070) (0.084) (0.050) (0.069) (0.079) 
R2 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.020 0.013 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,778 5,778 5,778 5,778 5,778 5,778 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of fixed effects regression analyses using the CARs of 
different event windows as dependent variable. The variables are defined in Table 14. Stars denote 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Columns (1)-(6) denote different event windows. 
Table 21 Regression Results – Conventional Announcements (Life Insurers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Event Window (-2/+1) (-2/+2) (-1/+1) (0/+1) (0/0) (-1/+2) 
Size 0.041 0.028 0.106*** 0.085*** 0.054*** 0.031 
 (0.043) (0.022) (0.033) (0.026) (0.016) (0.027) 
Leverage 0.163 0.080 0.115 0.122 0.026 0.081 
 (0.226) (0.080) (0.305) (0.229) (0.083) (0.121) 
Z-Score -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk -0.023 -0.036** -0.110*** -0.084*** -0.063*** -0.031 
 (0.030) (0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.011) (0.021) 
Cost Efficiency 0.209 -0.123 0.292** 0.369** 0.215** 0.084 
 (0.231) (0.162) (0.108) (0.140) (0.086) (0.231) 
Market Share -0.686 -0.164 -0.604 -0.647 -0.426 -0.207 
 (1.053) (0.505) (0.641) (0.507) (0.426) (0.620) 
Growth -0.002 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.021 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
Multi 0.054 0.063 0.202** 0.125** 0.093** 0.060 
 (0.089) (0.053) (0.077) (0.059) (0.038) (0.064) 
Crisis -0.009 0.044*** -0.022** -0.023*** 0.005 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) 
Constant -0.752 -0.446 -1.872*** -1.534*** -0.964*** -0.550 
 (0.732) (0.376) (0.560) (0.442) (0.278) (0.463) 
R2 0.041 0.118 0.091 0.089 0.120 0.049 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 666 666 666 666 666 666 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of fixed effects regression analyses using the CARs of 
different event windows as dependent variable. The variables are defined in Table 14. Stars denote 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Columns (1)-(6) denote different event windows. 
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Table 22 and Table 23 present the regression results for bailouts and frauds. The 
results indicate that, for property-casualty insurers, most firm level determinants remain 
insignificant, indicating a rather homogeneous stock price response of insurance firms 
towards shocks from the banking sector (Ricci, 2015). This provides unfavorable news 
for investors, as banking shocks affect the overall sector, and investments in for 
property-casualty insurance firms are unable to diversify banking risk away, given their 
homogeneous response. For life insurers, we find evidence that safer and larger life 
insurers are less affected by banking shocks, indicated by Z-Score and Size. Overall, 
these results provide valuable information from an asset pricing perspective for 
investors, given the severe consequences of banking events for insurance firms. Again, 
the coefficient of Crisis is mostly positive and significant, indicating that shocks from 
the banking sector have a more pronounced effect in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Table 22 Regression Results – Finance Events (PC Insurers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Event Window (-8/+8) (-8/+2) (0/+2) (-2/+2) (-1/+1) (-8/+2) 
Size -0.019 -0.051 -0.030* -0.027** -0.028 -0.005 
 (0.020) (0.031) (0.016) (0.012) (0.022) (0.018) 
Leverage -0.149 -0.238 -0.159 -0.098 -0.087 -0.254** 
 (0.129) (0.175) (0.133) (0.123) (0.142) (0.127) 
Z-Score 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk -0.060 -0.066 -0.061 -0.075** -0.042 -0.086 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.042) (0.031) (0.037) (0.066) 
Cost Efficiency 0.044*** 0.037* 0.028* 0.007 0.031 0.021 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
Market Share -0.266 2.197*** 0.197 -0.023 0.666 -0.697 
 (0.950) (0.583) (0.710) (0.769) (0.461) (0.949) 
Growth 0.002 -0.051 -0.028 -0.031 -0.023 -0.010 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.032) 
Multi -0.024* 0.031 0.008 0.022* 0.002 -0.072*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) 
Crisis 0.000 0.001 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.001 0.020** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Constant 0.335 0.821 0.516* 0.477** 0.441 0.190 
 (0.352) (0.542) (0.298) (0.231) (0.400) (0.308) 
R2 0.177 0.150 0.176 0.157 0.151 0.170 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 629 629 629 629 629 629 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of fixed effects regression analyses using the CARs of 
different event windows as dependent variable. The variables are defined in Table 14. Stars denote 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Columns (1)-(6) denote different event windows.  
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Table 23 Regression Results – Finance Events (Life Insurers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Event Window (-8/+8) (-8/+2) (0/+2) (-2/+2) (-1/+1) (-8/+2) 
Size -0.028 -0.022 -0.082*** -0.134*** -0.028* -0.111*** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.016) (0.022) 
Leverage -0.115 -0.280* -0.235 -0.016 -0.122 -0.065 
 (0.123) (0.144) (0.141) (0.214) (0.099) (0.172) 
Z-Score -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk 0.019 0.032 0.057* 0.087** 0.035 0.063** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.031) (0.042) (0.021) (0.030) 
Cost Efficiency -0.182 -0.230 -0.384*** -0.473*** -0.204* -0.528** 
 (0.169) (0.161) (0.131) (0.149) (0.109) (0.220) 
Market Share 0.013 0.174 0.619** 0.663* -0.010 0.904*** 
 (0.217) (0.250) (0.297) (0.362) (0.225) (0.292) 
Growth 0.038 0.012 -0.021 -0.022 0.034 -0.029 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.044) (0.028) (0.037) 
Multi -0.007 0.030 -0.074 -0.269*** -0.018 -0.180*** 
 (0.045) (0.054) (0.070) (0.091) (0.045) (0.064) 
Crisis -0.001 -0.002 0.055*** 0.097*** 0.017 0.058*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.016) 
Constant 0.529* 0.479 1.474*** 2.412*** 0.537* 2.008*** 
 (0.309) (0.402) (0.416) (0.497) (0.286) (0.409) 
R2 0.102 0.155 0.205 0.277 0.141 0.265 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 367 367 367 367 367 367 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of fixed effects regression analyses using the CARs of 
different event windows as dependent variable. The variables are defined in Table 14. Stars denote 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
Columns (1)-(6) denote different event windows. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
We analyze the stock market reaction of U.S. insurance firms to conventional 
and non-conventional monetary policy interventions undertaken during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 using an event study methodology. In addition, we examine how 
shocks from the banking sector (bailouts and frauds) affect the stock prices of firms 
from the insurance sector. In addition, we analyze the heterogeneity in insurer’s stock 
response by regression analyses. Our database consists of 89 policy announcements and 
10 banking sector shocks. 
Our results are consistent with the findings from aggregate markets, risk premia 
and banks (Aït-Sahalia et al., 2012, Fiordelisi, Galloppo and Ricci, 2014 and Ricci, 
2015), as they indicate that policy interventions were indeed able to affect the stock 
prices of insurance firms during the crisis. Moreover, our results indicate that several 
types of announcements were state-dependent, as the same type of measure had 
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different effects depending on the state of the crisis. In particular, the results for interest 
decisions indicate that investors reacted to such announcements partly consistent with 
theoretical predictions and previous literature (e.g. Madura and Schnusenberg, 2000; 
Brewer III et al., 2007) during the Subprime Crisis. During the Global Financial Crisis, 
however, the opposite is the case (consistent with the findings for banks in Ricci, 2015). 
Thus, the stock market rather appreciates the efforts of central banks to improve the 
economic environment by lowering interest rates instead of emphasizing the impact on 
the interest rate business models of insurance firms. Moreover, our results indicate that 
shocks from the banking sector significantly affect insurance firms. Again, the effects 
are strongly state dependent and increase in effect with the outbreak of the financial 
crisis.  
Our results have important implications, in particular for investors and 
policymakers. From an asset pricing perspective, our results indicate that shocks from 
the banking sector affect insurance firms, while insurance-related events do not affect 
the banking sector as found in Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011). Hence, 
insurance stocks are not suitable to diversify banking risk. In addition, this finding 
indicates a high degree of interconnectedness in the financial sector, as banks and 
insurers are affected similarly by such events. From a policymakers perspective, our 
results indicate that regulatory measures that primary aim to stabilize the banking and 
financial sector also affect the insurance sector, depending on their content and the 
economic environment. Hence, they help to achieve the primary target of insurance 
regulation, that is, the protection of policyholders (Klein, 1995). Hence, our research 
provides evidence that the insurance sector is highly exposed to shocks from the 
banking sector. Also, we show that this exposure increased since the outbreak of the 
financial crisis. Given that the recent crisis emerged in the banking sector from its 
subprime exposures, our results provide valuable knowledge for investors and 
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regulators. However, our research also indicates that policymakers have adequate means 
to counteract such crises that emerged from the banking sector.  
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